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MANAGING DIGITAL DISCOVERY IN 
CRIMINAL CASES 
JENIA I. TURNER* 
The burdens and challenges of discovery—especially electronic 
discovery—are usually associated with civil, not criminal cases.  This is 
beginning to change.  Already common in white-collar crime cases, 
voluminous digital discovery is increasingly a feature of ordinary criminal 
prosecutions. 
This Article examines the explosive growth of digital evidence in 
criminal cases and the efforts to manage its challenges.  It then advances 
three claims about criminal case discovery in the digital age.  First, the 
volume, complexity, and cost of digital discovery will incentivize the 
prosecution and the defense to cooperate more closely in cases with 
significant amounts of electronically stored information (ESI).  Second, 
cooperation between the parties will not be sufficient to address the serious 
challenges that digital discovery presents to the fair and accurate 
resolution of criminal cases.  And third, for that reason, digital discovery in 
criminal cases needs to be regulated more closely. 
In crafting such regulation, courts and legislators can build on the 
civil procedure model, which has grappled with the challenges of electronic 
discovery for over two decades.  The civil procedure experience suggests 
that cooperation between the parties, active judicial involvement, and more 
detailed rules are essential to the effective management of digital discovery. 
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The civil litigation model has its limitations, however, and 
policymakers must chart new ground to address some of the unique 
demands of criminal cases.  Recognizing the significant resource and 
bargaining disparities in criminal cases, judges need to limit certain 
negotiated waivers of discovery so as to prevent abuse.  Where the interests 
of justice demand it, courts may also need to help defendants obtain access 
to digital discovery in detention or gather digital evidence from third 
parties.  These and other measures can help ensure that the cost and 
complexity of digital discovery do not undermine the fairness and accuracy 
of criminal proceedings. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The burdens and challenges of discovery—especially electronic 
discovery—are usually associated with civil cases.  Yet this is beginning to 
change: Already common in white-collar crime cases, voluminous digital 
discovery is increasingly a feature of ordinary criminal prosecutions.1 
Digital evidence in criminal cases is exploding. More and more 
crimes, from theft to drug trafficking to child pornography, are committed 
in cyberspace.2  Smartphones, digital devices, and programmable home 
appliances have become central to our daily lives, and the evidence they 
generate is increasingly used in the prosecution and defense of criminal 
cases.3  Law enforcement is also proactively using advanced technology to 
prevent and investigate crime, and these efforts result in digital evidence.4 
As electronically stored information (ESI) in criminal cases expands, 
its processing, disclosure, and review present novel problems for the 
prosecution and the defense.  How will the terabytes of evidence be 
stored?5  Who should bear the cost of formatting digital evidence to make it 
searchable?6  When digital files of wiretap recordings and video 
surveillance are not searchable, should the prosecution be required to 
categorize or index them?7  Should the prosecution be required to identify 
 
 1 Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, April 28, 2017, at 22, in Advisory Committee 
on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., October 24, 2017, at 40; Memorandum from 
Professors Sara Sun Beale and Nancy King, Reporters, to Criminal Rules Committee, April 
12, 2017, in Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 28, 
2017, at 167 (“All attendees [of mini conference hosted by the Rules Committee] agreed that 
ESI discovery problems can arise in both small and large cases, that these issues are handled 
very differently between districts, and that most criminal cases now include ESI.”) 
[hereinafter Beale and King Memorandum]. 
 2 See infra Part II. 
 3 See id. 
 4 Michael R. Doucette, Virginia Prosecutors’ Response to Two Models of Pre-Plea 
Discovery in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 
415, 430 (“With modern technology, law enforcement generates far greater discoverable 
information. Dash-mounted camera video, body worn camera video, and jailhouse telephone 
audio are just a few examples of this new technology. One individual traffic stop could 
generate several hours of video and audio evidence.”); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, 
Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 354–75 (2015). 
 5 See infra Part IV.A. 
 6 See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 296 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 7 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, No. 3:13-CR-161, 2014 WL 2574765, at *1–3 
(E.D. Tenn. June 6, 2014). 
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exculpatory evidence within a gargantuan ESI production?8  How will 
metadata and sensitive information be handled?9  How should access to 
digital discovery be provided to defendants who are detained before trial?10 
A growing number of criminal cases present these questions and more.  
The lack of time, resources, and expertise to process and review 
voluminous digital evidence (especially on the defense side) is leading to 
disputes about which party bears the burden of searching for relevant and 
potentially exculpatory documents.11  With respect to sensitive documents 
(which might contain items such as child pornography, information that 
may endanger witnesses, and confidential documents), the parties must 
determine what type of access complies with the discovery rules while 
safeguarding important public interests.12  Third-party possession of 
relevant evidence may also complicate discovery, particularly for 
defendants, because they have limited means of obtaining digital evidence 
from non-parties.13  Finally, cases where defendants are detained raise 
special problems because inmates have limited or no access to electronic 
evidence in jail and thus have difficulty assisting their attorneys in 
preparing an effective defense.14 
The lack of clear legal rules adds to the difficulty.  Rules of criminal 
procedure are typically silent on digital discovery, and case law is scant and 
varies greatly from one court to the next.15  Practitioners are therefore left to 
 
 8 See infra Part IV.B. 
 9 See infra Parts IV.A and IV.C. 
 10 See infra Part IV.E. 
 11 See, e.g., State v. Dingman, 202 P.3d 388, 395–96 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (involving 
dispute about the format in which evidence must be produced); United States v. 
Rubin/Chambers, 825 F. Supp. 2d 451, 453–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (involving dispute about the 
format of production and the burden of identifying exculpatory documents). 
 12 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 191 F. Supp. 3d 363, 366–69 (M.D. Pa. 2016) 
(dispute about scope of discovery in light of protective order); Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 
487, 503 (Tex. App. 2002) (dispute about the location where evidence of child pornography 
crime may be reviewed by defense counsel). 
 13 See Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S. Genetski, Criminal Discovery of Internet 
Communications Under the Stored Communications Act: It’s Not A Level Playing Field, 97 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 569, 590–97 (2007). 
 14 See, e.g., Sean Broderick & Russell M. Aoki, Federal Indigent Defense: How to Stop 
Worrying and Love the Digital Age, 30 CRIM. JUST., Winter 2016, at 4, 9. 
 15 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; United States v. Meredith, No. 3:12-CR-00143-CRS, 
2015 WL 5570033, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2015). But see N.J. CT. R. 3:13; cf. M.R.U. 
CRIM. P. 16 (noting that where practicable, the prosecutor must provide the defendant “an 
opportunity to obtain an electronic copy, at any reasonable time and in any reasonable 
manner,” and where the prosecutor is unable to do so, “because the technology makes such 
provision impracticable,” or when copying is not legally permitted, the prosecutor must 
provide the defendant “a reasonable opportunity” to review such evidence). 
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devise solutions on an ad hoc basis, through informal discussions and 
negotiations.16 
After analyzing these problems, the Article advances three claims 
about the future of criminal case discovery in the digital age.  First, the 
volume, complexity, and cost of digital discovery will incentivize the 
prosecution and the defense to cooperate more closely in cases with 
significant amounts of ESI.  Second, cooperation between the parties will 
not be sufficient to address the serious challenges that digital discovery 
presents to the fair and accurate resolution of criminal cases.  And third, for 
that reason, digital discovery in criminal cases needs to be regulated more 
closely.  In crafting regulation, courts and legislators can build on the civil 
procedure model of electronic discovery, while recognizing the differences 
between civil and criminal cases and tailoring new rules accordingly. 
As the volume of ESI in criminal cases expands, defense attorneys and 
prosecutors will feel greater pressure to cooperate and negotiate about 
discovery.  Decisions in cases with massive digital evidence already 
reference informal agreements between the parties to tailor the scope of 
discovery and to assist the defense with ESI processing.17  The presence of 
ESI is changing the parties’ incentives and leading them to shift from a 
largely adversarial to a more collaborative approach to discovery.18 
Collaboration in electronic discovery (e-discovery) is already heavily 
encouraged in complex civil cases.  As ESI has proliferated over the last 
two decades, both the rules of civil procedure and judicial decisions have 
promoted consultation and negotiation between parties about e-discovery.19  
Initial evidence suggests that, when cooperation occurs, it reduces the costs 
of e-discovery and is well-received by the litigants.20  Accordingly, the civil 
procedure model can offer useful guidance for reforming digital discovery 
in criminal cases.21 
 
 16 See infra Part V.A. 
 17 See id. 
 18 See infra Part V.B. 
 19 FED. R. CIV. P. 26; see also Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C 
5711, 2012 WL 4498465, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012) (“Since its publication in 2009, 
more than 100 federal judges have endorsed the Cooperation Proclamation [which urges 
parties to adopt a collaborative approach to discovery].”); Sedona Conference, Commentary 
on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 289 (2010); SHIRA A. 
SCHEINDLIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN A 
NUTSHELL 106 (2009) (noting judicial endorsement of collaborative approach to e-
discovery). 
 20 See infra note 330and accompanying text. 
 21 Cf. Russell M. Gold et al., Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607 
(2017) (arguing in favor of adopting civil-like settlement procedures in the criminal system); 
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In fact, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, which recently 
considered the challenges of digital evidence in criminal cases, took note of 
the civil procedure experience and opted to encourage greater cooperation 
between the parties.  The Committee approved a new draft rule of criminal 
procedure, Rule 16.1, which expressly requires the prosecution and the 
defense to meet and confer about pretrial disclosure shortly after 
arraignment.22  Should negotiation between the parties fail, the parties “may 
ask the court to determine or modify the timing, manner, or other aspects of 
disclosure to facilitate preparation for trial.”23 
Such efforts to promote cooperation are an important first step, but are 
not sufficient to address the serious challenges of digital discovery in 
criminal cases.24  Cooperation will fail to yield results where the volume of 
evidence overwhelms one or both of the parties.25  Negotiations between 
the parties can also lead to unfair results, especially because the standard 
criminal case features disparities between the defense and prosecution in 
terms of resources, investigative powers, and bargaining leverage.26  
Furthermore, because prosecutors and defense attorneys are likely to differ 
in their willingness to bargain, negotiations are also likely to lead to 
disparate results in similarly situated cases.  To avoid these negative 
 
Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79 
BROOK. L. REV. 1091 (2014) (arguing for comparative analysis of civil and criminal 
discovery regimes); David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without 
Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 
GEO. L.J. 683 (2006) (arguing in favor of comparative analysis of the civil and criminal 
procedure models). 
 22 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, 
Bankruptcy, and Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and Rules Governing 
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, and the Rules Governing Section 
2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts (Aug. 2017), at 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/preliminary_draft_08_2017_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/46NM-M8YF] [hereinafter Draft Rule 16.1]. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See infra Parts VC & VI.B. 
 25 See United States v. Budovsky, No. 13 CR 00368 (DLC), 2016 WL 386133, at *12 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016) (“Given the fact that the discovery contains so many pages and 
lines of data, no attorney or team of attorneys could meaningfully review all of it even with 
years to prepare for trial. The parties agree that choices have to be made; the Government 
freely admits that it has not reviewed all of the material in this case.”). 
 26 See generally Human Rights Watch, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How U.S. Federal 
Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty (2013); Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 66, 85–105 (1968); Rachel E. 
Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative 
Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 874–84 (2009); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and 
Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004). 
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consequences of negotiated digital discovery, stricter regulation of the 
process is needed. 
As courts and legislators consider suitable regulation for e-discovery 
in criminal cases, they can look to the civil experience for helpful insights 
on managing the challenges of digital evidence.  While promoting 
cooperation, legislators should also draft more detailed rules to guide e-
discovery where cooperation fails.27  Judges should become more active in 
managing the discovery process and should involve magistrates in the 
effort.28 
At the same time, policymakers must adjust the civil model to meet the 
unique practical demands and legal environment of criminal cases.29  The 
lack of resources in criminal cases—especially on the defense side—will 
demand the reallocation of criminal justice budgets and the creation of 
specialized infrastructure to ensure that digital discovery does not produce 
unfair and unjust outcomes.30  The more robust constitutional protections in 
criminal cases—including the rights to due process, speedy trial, and 
effective counsel—may require greater judicial involvement in ensuring 
that digital discovery proceeds fairly.  To ensure such fairness, judges need 
to take into account the special difficulties detained defendants face in 
accessing computers31 and the hurdles that criminal defense attorneys 
experience in gathering digital evidence from third parties.32  Courts must 
also recognize the vastly unequal bargaining powers of the prosecution and 
defense and limit negotiated waivers of critical discovery rights to prevent 
abuse.33  Finally, courts and legislators need to draft clearer background 
rules about digital discovery to enhance predictability, promote consistent 
treatment across cases, and reduce disputes about digital discovery. 
In the more distant future, technological innovation may help the 
criminal justice system solve many of the problems that plague discovery of 
voluminous digital evidence today.  Until then, the parties can ease some of 
the difficulties of digital discovery by cooperating with each other.  But 
where cooperation fails or reflects vastly unequal bargaining powers, rules 
and judicial decisions must provide a backstop.  Tailored regulation of e-
discovery in criminal cases is needed to ensure that the novel problems 
 
 27 See infra Part VI.C. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See infra Part VI.B & VI.C. 
 30 See infra Part VI.C. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. For a general discussion of the ethical and legal concerns with discovery waivers, 
see Ellen S. Podgor, Pleading Blindly, 80 MISS. L.J. 1633, 1641 (2011). 
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posed by digital evidence do not undermine the fairness, accuracy, and 
transparency that discovery rules were designed to ensure. 
II. EXPANDING DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 
Information technology has become ubiquitous.  As it permeates our 
daily lives, it also leaves digital footprints that can be useful sources of 
evidence in criminal cases.  This occurs in three principal ways. 
First, the daily activities of individuals and businesses are increasingly 
facilitated—and thus recorded—by digital devices.  Businesses document 
“virtually all” of their operations in electronic form.34  With more than 92% 
of U.S. adults owning cell phones and roughly three-fourths owning a 
computer, individuals also record most of their own movements, 
communications, and images in a digital format.35  Our cars, houses, and 
workplaces are increasingly connected to the Internet, creating massive 
databases of our daily activities.36  When a crime is committed, the digital 
trace left by our pervasive use of technology provides an invaluable 
investigative resource.37  It also creates a mass of discoverable evidence for 
prosecutors and defense attorneys to sift through. 
Second, just as ordinary individuals use computers and the Internet on 
a regular basis, criminals increasingly rely on digital technology to ply their 
trade.  A recent report on gang activity found that “there’s nearly always a 
link between an outbreak of gang violence and something online.”38  
Crimes as varied as theft, fraud, hacking, child pornography, drug 
trafficking, and the sale of stolen identities and ransomware today occur, at 
least in part, on the Internet.  As FBI Director Wray remarked earlier this 
year: 
 
[T]here’s a technology and digital component to almost every case we have now. 
 
 34 James N. Dertouzos et al., RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., The Legal and Economic 
Implications of Electronic Discovery: Options for Future Research 1 (2008). 
 35 Monica Anderson, The Demographics of Device Ownership, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 29, 
2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/the-demographics-of-device-ownership 
[https://perma.cc/E5YR-ESHH]. 
 36 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of 
Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 819–20 (2016). 
 37 See, e.g., Marlo Pfister Cadeddu & Eric J.R. Nichols, State Criminal Discovery Rules 
and ESI, TXBB-E-DISCOVERY § 23.5 (2014) (“Requests for electronic storage media devices 
and data have now become commonplace components of search warrants . . . .”). 
 38 Michael Tarm, Social Media Altering Street-Gang Culture, Fueling Violence, CHI. 
SUN TIMES (June 11, 2018, 12:34 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/social-media-
street-chicago-gang-culture-fueling-violence/ [https://perma.cc/U7N2-BWH6]. 
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Transnational crime groups, sexual predators, fraudsters, and terrorists are 
transforming the way they do business as technology evolves. Significant pieces of 
these crimes—and our investigations of them—have a digital component or occur 
almost entirely online . . . . 
And the avalanche of data created by our use of technology presents a huge 
challenge for every organization.39 
Private companies that have analyzed the incidence of cybercrime in 
the United States report a dramatic increase.40  One analysis found that from 
2013 to 2015, costs of cybercrime quadrupled, and it further predicted that 
they will quadruple again from 2015 to 2019.41  The rise of cybercrime is a 
global phenomenon.  In 2016, Europol reported that “the additional increase 
in volume, scope and financial damage combined with the asymmetric risk 
that characterizes cybercrime has reached such a level that in some EU 
countries cybercrime may have surpassed traditional crime in terms of 
reporting.”42  As cybercrime grows, it also creates vast amounts of 
electronic evidence that needs to be reviewed and disclosed in a criminal 
prosecution. 
The surveillance activities of law enforcement provide the third 
principal source of digital evidence.  Police are proactively using a wide 
array of digital technology to prevent and investigate crime.  Automatic 
license plate readers, body cameras, facial recognition technology, 
surveillance cameras, GPS tracking, and cell site location data, to name just 
 
 39 Remarks by Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Fordham 
University, Jan. 9, 2018. 
 40 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CENTER, 2016 
ANNUAL REPORT, available at https://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreports.aspx (source on file 
with author) (reporting an increase in financial losses due to Internet-facilitated crime since 
2012); Danielle Wiener-Bronner, Report Shows Cyber Crime is on the Rise, ATLANTIC (Apr. 
22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/04/report-shows-cyber-
espionage-is-on-the-rise/361024/ (reporting an overall increase in the threat of cybercrime in 
the United States in 2014). 
 41 Steve Morgan, Cyber Crime Costs Projected To Reach $2 Trillion by 2019, FORBES 
(Jan. 17, 2016, 11:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/01/17/cyber-
crime-costs-projected-to-reach-2-trillion-by-2019/#4153107d3a91 [https://perma.cc/5LQM-
9R24]. 
 42 EUROPOL, IOCTA 2016: INTERNET ORGANISED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 7, 
available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/internet-
organised-crime-threat-assessment-iocta-2016 [https://perma.cc/RJ6K-AZNY]. In the United 
Kingdom, online fraud has become the most common crime. Martin Evans & Patrick Scott, 
Fraud and Cyber Crime Are Now the Country’s Most Common Offences, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 
19, 2017, 6:05 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/19/fraud-cyber-crime-now-
countrys-common-offences/https:// [perma.cc/HWS3-8G8C]. 
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a few, have become critical tools of the modern police.43  As the Supreme 
Court remarked in Carpenter v. United States last term, “seismic shifts in 
digital technology” have allowed for near-constant surveillance by law 
enforcement.44  This new type of policing produces massive amounts of 
digital data, even for ordinary crimes.45  The result is that, “[f]rom Fitbits to 
PlayStations, the justice system is drowning in digital evidence.”46 
III. BACKGROUND DISCOVERY REQUIREMENTS 
To appreciate why voluminous ESI presents challenges for the parties 
in criminal cases, it is important to understand the basic discovery 
responsibilities of prosecutors and defense attorneys.  Constitutional 
doctrine, statutory law, and rules of criminal procedure regulate when, 
what, and how the parties need to disclose to each other.  This Part provides 
a brief overview of these laws and highlights a few aspects of discovery 
rules that make digital discovery particularly challenging. 
The Supreme Court has set a constitutional baseline for prosecutors’ 
obligations, requiring that prosecutors disclose exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence before trial.47  State and federal rules additionally 
require the prosecution to produce statements by the defendant, as well as 
certain documents and expert reports that are relevant to the case—whether 
in digital or paper form.48 
Beyond that shared baseline, discovery rules vary significantly from 
state to state—both as to the type of evidence that must be disclosed and as 
to the timing of the discovery.  As a result of recent discovery reforms, a 
 
 43 See generally ANDREW G. FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: 
SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017) (discussing the 
increasing use of a range of new surveillance technologies by law enforcement). 
 44 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018). 
 45 See Sean Broderick et al., Criminal E-Discovery: A Pocket Guide for Judges, FJC-
MISC-2015-5 (2015) (noting that even routine prosecutions of drug cases and robberies 
regularly rely on cell phone data or video surveillance). 
 46 Matt Burgess, From Fitbits to PlayStations, the Justice System Is Drowning in Digital 
Evidence, WIRED U.K. (Apr. 20, 2018), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-police-courts-
data-justice-trials-digital-evidence-rape-cases-cps [https://perma.cc/JJ9W-CRDP]. 
 47 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (holding that due process was 
violated and a new trial warranted when the prosecution failed to disclose information 
regarding the credibility of its witness and the witness’s credibility was material to guilt or 
innocence); See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates 
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of 
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
 48 See, e.g., FED R. CRIM. P. 16; ALA. R. CRIM. P. 16; CAL. PEN. CODE § 1054; N.Y. CRIM. 
P. L. § 240; TEX. CODE CRIM. P. § 39.14. 
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slight majority of states now require the prosecution to disclose witness 
names, witness statements, and police reports before trial.49  A few states 
have gone further and adopted entirely “open-file” discovery, requiring 
prosecutors to disclose to the defense well before trial virtually all evidence 
relevant to the case.50  Even in jurisdictions where discovery rules are not as 
demanding, local rules, standing court orders, or internal prosecutorial 
policies frequently mandate that prosecutors produce broader categories of 
evidence early in the process.51 
As prosecutorial duties to disclose evidence have expanded, so have 
reciprocal duties for the defense.52  Today, “[n]early all states . . . require 
defendants to give advance notice of any expert evidence and of witnesses 
they will use for certain defenses (such as alibi, self-defense, and insanity) 
and also to cooperate in ‘giving evidence’ through means such as blood 
tests or participation in identification line-ups.”53  Further, discovery rules 
ordinarily require a defendant who has availed himself of prosecutorial 
disclosures to disclose a range of items (such as documents and tangible 
objects, results or reports of physical or mental examinations or scientific 
tests, and summaries of expert testimony) that are in his custody or control 
and that the defense intends to use at trial.54  A few states have even 
expanded defense disclosure duties to include witness names and 
statements.55 
When either party discloses evidence, it also typically has a duty to 
ensure that disclosure would not harm the privacy or safety of affected 
individuals.  Accordingly, when the prosecution is required to produce 
 
 49 See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (2015); Darryl K. 
Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 
93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1622–23 (2005). Seventeen states currently require some version of 
open-file discovery. Jenia I. Turner & Allison Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in 
Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH & LEE L. REV. 285, 399, at App’x 2 
(2016). 
 50 TEX. CODE CRIM. P. § 39.14. 
 51 Daniel S. McConkie, The Local Rules Revolution in Criminal Discovery, 39 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 59, 61 (2017). 
 52 See Wayne R. LaFave et al., The “Two-Way Street” Movement in Discovery, 5 CRIM. 
PROC. § 20.1(d) (4th ed. 2017). 
 53 Darryl K. Brown, Discovery, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
PROCESSES 147, 167 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), http://academyforjustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/7_Reforming-Criminal-Justice_Vol_3_Discovery.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7UA7-6AQY]. 
 54 See, e.g., FED R. CRIM. P. 16(b); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(d). 
 55 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(d); N.J. Ct. R. 3:13; see also TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE & 
TEXAS APPLESEED, IMPROVING DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES IN TEXAS: HOW BEST 
PRACTICES CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER JUSTICE 15, 38 (2013); Brown, supra note 53, at 155. 
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police reports or witness statements to the defense, but it has concerns 
about the safety or privacy of its witnesses, it can request that the court 
issue protective orders,56 or it may be able to redact portions of the 
disclosed documents.57  Some states, like Texas, place on defense counsel 
the burden of locating sensitive information and redacting it or withholding 
it from the client and third parties.58 
The trend toward broader discovery from the prosecution has been 
motivated by concerns that restrictive discovery can result in wrongful 
convictions, unjust sentences, and unnecessary litigation.59  The move 
toward broader discovery from the defense has been spurred by a desire to 
ensure more truthful outcomes.60  It has also been justified on grounds of 
reciprocity—as defendants receive from the prosecution more than the 
Constitution requires,61 they are also expected to provide reciprocal 
disclosures.62 
In complex cases with a large digital footprint, broad discovery means 
that both the prosecution and the defense have to deal with voluminous 
productions.  The broadest discovery, so called “open-file” discovery, often 
relieves prosecutors from the task of reviewing each individual file before 
producing it.  But the burden of review is then shifted onto the defense, 
which has limited time and resources to sift through gigabytes of data.63  
Moreover, even in open-file discovery regimes, the prosecution may still 
have to review individual files carefully to ensure that it does not produce 
evidence that is legally protected or may jeopardize the safety of witnesses. 
Rules of criminal procedure have not kept pace with the growth of ESI 
and the special demands it places on prosecutors and defense attorneys.  
Federal and state rules remain silent on the problems related to the volume 
 
 56 E.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(l); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A–908; TEX. CODE CRIM. 
P. art. 39.14(e)(1); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 16(f). 
 57 E.g., IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(9)(B); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 39.14(c). 
 58 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.2; IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(9)(A), 16(d)(1)(C); 
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 39.14(f). 
 59 Turner & Redlich, supra note 49, at 290–91. 
 60 See, e.g., Jones v. Super. Ct. of Nevada Cty., 372 P.2d 919, 920 (Cal. 1962). 
 61 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972); see also Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 62 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1975 enactment; see also LaFave, 
supra note 52, at § 20.1(d) (noting that one motivation for the adoption of “reciprocal 
discovery” from the defense has been to “even the playing field” between prosecutors and 
defense attorneys in being able to prevent trial by ambush). 
 63 See infra notes 107, 113, 319–321 and accompanying text. 
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and complexity of digital discovery.64  A few federal courts have issued 
local rules or standing orders to address ESI;65 others have looked to the 
rules of civil procedure as a model to resolve disputes; 66 and yet others 
have experimented with case-by-case solutions.67  Digital discovery is 
therefore handled differently from state to state, from court to court, and 
from judge to judge.68  And as Part V discusses, in many cases, the parties 
have been left to negotiate solutions on their own.  
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF DIGITAL DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES 
A. STORAGE AND PROCESSING COSTS 
The first challenge of cases involving ESI is the sheer volume of 
information produced.  As the use of digital technology has become 
commonplace for individuals and businesses, cases involving gigabytes69—
and even terabytes70—of data are no longer unusual.71  Technology experts 
 
 64 See, e.g., United States v. Meredith, 2015 WL 5570033, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 
2015) (noting a “dearth of precedent” on “what constitutes sufficiently usable discovery” in 
the ESI context). The exception is New Jersey, which has specifically addressed the 
challenges of e-discovery in criminal cases. See N.J. CT. R. 3:13–3. 
 65 McConkie, supra note 51; see also General Order Regarding Best Practices for 
Electronic Discovery of Documentary Materials in Criminal Cases, G.O. 09-05 (W.D. Okla. 
2009); Best Practices for Electronic Discovery in Criminal Cases (W.D. Wash. 2013). 
 66 United States v. Briggs, 831 F. Supp. 2d 623, 628 (W.D.N.Y. 2011); United States v. 
O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 18-24 (D.D.C. 2008); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 
F.3d 266, 296 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 67 See infra Parts IV.A & IV.B. 
 68 Beale and King Memorandum, supra note 1, at 167. 
 69 Experts estimate that 1 GB contains between 50,000 to 75,000 pages of Word 
documents. Doug Austin, eDiscovery Best Practices: Perspective on the Amount of Data 
Contained in 1 Gigabyte, CLOUDNINE (Mar. 5, 2012), https://ediscovery.co/ 
ediscoverydaily/electronic-discovery/ediscovery-best-practices-perspective-on-the-amount-
of-data-contained-in-1-gigabyte/ [https://perma.cc/WJ5Q-CLD9]. Images require more 
storage space, so 1 GB is estimated to hold just over 15,000 pages of images. LexisNexis 
Discovery Services, Pages in a Gigabyte, LEXISNEXIS (2007), https://www.lexisnexis.com/ 
applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitePapers/ADI_FS_PagesInAGigabyte.pdf (source on file 
with author). When it comes to videos, 1 GB can mean just about one hour of video. Melvin 
Foo, How Much Can a 1TB Hard Drive Hold?,  PC NINJA  (FEB. 8, 2012), 
http://www.pcninja.us/how-much-can-a-1-tb-hard-drive-hold/ [https://perma.cc/LG5Z-
LLN8]. 
 70 According to one estimate: 
[C]onsidering that one terabyte is generally estimated to contain 75 million pages, 
a one-terabyte case could amount to 18,750,000 documents, assuming an average 
of four pages per document. Further assuming that a lawyer or paralegal can 
review 50 documents per hour (a very fast review rate), it would take 375,000 
hours to complete the review. In other words, it would take more than 185 
reviewers working 2,000 hours each per year to complete the review within a year. 
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estimate that “the global volume of electronically stored data is doubling 
every two years,” meaning that the problem is increasing exponentially.72 
The expanding volume of digital evidence makes it difficult for 
attorneys in criminal cases to store the information in a way that can be 
easily retrieved, reviewed, and used at trial as needed.  For federal 
prosecutors, storage and management of e-discovery is usually not a 
problem because the Department of Justice has a centralized e-discovery 
support framework for U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the country.73  
Funded by a six-year, $1.1 billion contract, the Litigation Technology 
Service Center (“LTSC”) helps prosecutors “digitize[e] paper 
documents . . . [and] cod[e] and load[] electronic documents into 
databases.” 74  The services also include “Bates labeling, deduplication, and 
email threading.”75  Importantly, digital files “are provided in a variety of 
 
Assuming each reviewer is paid $50 per hour (a bargain), the cost could be more 
than $18,750,000. 
Austin, supra note 69. On the other hand, since videos take up much more space, 1 TB is 
estimated to hold around 1,000 hours or about 40 days of video files. Foo, supra note 69. 
 71 See, e.g., United States v. Hofstetter, 2018 WL 813254, at *14 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 9, 
2018) (noting discovery “consisting of well over a terabyte of data, approximately fifty 
compact discs containing audio and video recordings, and numerous imaged computer hard 
drives”); United States v. Budovsky, No. 13 CR 00368 (DLC), 2016 WL 386133, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016) (involving terabytes of discoverable data); United States v. Salyer, 
2011 WL 1466887, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Apr. 18, 2011) (“It is probably no exaggeration to state 
that 1-2 terabytes of information are involved.”); United States v. Shafer, 2011 WL 977891, 
at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2011) (involving 200 terabytes of ESI); see also 2017 REPORT OF 
THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 227 
(2018), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ files / 
2017_report_of_the_ad_hoc_ committee_to_review_ the_criminal_justice_act -revised_ 2 
811.9.17 .29_0.pdf  [https://perma.cc/FM2Z-8GW3] [hereinafter CARDONE REPORT] (citing 
witness from M.D.N.C. who testified that “it is not uncommon in this district to have fraud 
cases where three [terabytes] of information have been provided to counsel”). 
 72 Cindy LaChapelle, The Cost of Data Storage and Management: Where Is It Headed in 
2016?, DATA CENTER J., (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.datacenterjournal.com/cost-data-
storage-management-headed-2016/ (source on file with author). 
 73 Sean Broderick, Written Testimony to Criminal Justice Act Committee, Feb. 19, 2016, 
https://cjastudy.fd.org/sites/default/files/hearing-archives/san-francisco-
california/pdf/seanbrodericksan-franwrittentestimony-done.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TRX-
62ED] (noting that in 2013, the DOJ awarded $1.1 billion for contractors to provide the 
Criminal Division and six other units with electronic discovery processing, litigation support 
and case management services). 
 74 U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
U.S. ATTORNEYS: LITIGATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICE CENTER 2, DEPT. OF JUST. (2009), 
available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2014/05/22/pia_ltsc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B9EH-7HGK]. 
 75 Id. 
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formats including Concordance load files, CD/DVDs, and a secure intranet 
repository (iConect) within the Department of Justice (DOJ) firewall.”76 
Thanks to the discovery support provided by the LTSC, federal 
prosecutors are much better equipped to store and manage digital evidence 
than most of their state and local counterparts or defense attorneys.77  Yet 
the growth of digital data may soon overwhelm even the capacities of 
federal prosecutors, and certain mega cases have already tested the existing 
support framework.78 
On the other hand, for defense attorneys, who are frequently solo 
practitioners without sophisticated technology, a production of multiple 
gigabytes of data frequently exceeds the storage and backup capacity of 
their office hardware.79  And despite the dramatic decrease of storage costs 
for digital data generally, commercial storage for legal digital documents 
remains expensive.80  Some experts believe that the high cost reflects the 
complexity of managing the stored data;81 others suggest that it is driven by 
demand for digital storage by well-heeled law firms handling large business 
disputes.82  Whatever the reason, criminal defense attorneys often find it 
 
 76 Id. 
 77 Broderick, supra note 73 (discussing the disparity of e-discovery resources between 
federal prosecutors and federal defense attorneys); see also Doucette, supra note 4, at 431 
(noting that in Virginia, very few state prosecutors have electronic case-management 
systems, “and the costs of such systems are prohibitive for many offices”). 
 78 Kirk Johnson, Charges Against Bundys in Ranch Standoff Case Are Dismissed, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/08/us/bundy-ranch-standoff-case-
charges-dismissed.html [https://perma.cc/G9LS-QLUM] (discussing dismissal of charges for 
Brady violations in case involving massive ESI); Kevin Krause, Judge in John Wiley Price 
Trial Blasts Prosecution for ‘Improper Conduct,’ Reserves Right to Toss the Case, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2017/04/11/
judge-overseeing-john-wiley-price-corruption-trial-blasts-prosecution-improper-conduct 
[https://perma.cc/PWB3-CJ6M] (discussing prosecutorial discovery failures in case with 
massive ESI). 
 79 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 2014 WL 2574765, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. June 6, 
2014) (“[A]ccess to the hard drives is limited and the size of the hard drives may force 
counsel to upgrade their computer systems.”); Chris Raesz, File Safe, 46 VOICE FOR THE 
DEFENSE 27 (TCDLA Dec. 2017). 
 80 John W.M. Claud, Responding to Defense Demands for Government Assistance in 
Large ESI Criminal Cases, U.S. ATTYS’ BULL. 139, 145 (Jan. 2018); Broderick, supra note 
73. 
 81 LaChapelle, supra note 72. 
 82 Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, Criminal Defense Attorney, Oct. 19, 2017, Dallas, 
Texas. Stories of widely disparate storage estimates offered for the same case suggest that 
some type of market failure might be at play. Broderick, supra note 73 (“In a multi-
defendant mortgage fraud case with over three terabytes (three trillion bytes) of data, the 
cost of five vendor proposals for a web-hosted document review database ranged from 
$70,000 to $1.7 million.”). 
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prohibitively expensive to store and process voluminous digital evidence.83 
In turn, this creates delays as defense attorneys try to obtain more favorable 
rates from digital discovery vendors, additional funding from the court, or 
more tailored discovery from the prosecution.  Some defense attorneys end 
up personally shouldering some of the costs of processing and reviewing 
the evidence, without receiving full compensation for the review, and others 
likely forgo adequate review of the evidence.84 
To some degree, the problem of storage and management of digital 
evidence can be solved by centralizing the service on the defense side, as is 
already the case for federal prosecutors.  Federal public defenders’ offices 
are better positioned in this regard.  In Dallas, the Office of the Federal 
Public Defender pioneered a solution by buying a server of its own and 
storing ESI in both its own cases and those of appointed defense 
attorneys.85  Defense attorneys who have relied on this server estimate that 
it has saved the federal government millions of dollars.86  At the national 
level, the National Litigation Support Team for federal public defenders 
and appointed counsel has also recently contracted with several vendors to 
provide digital storage and processing services at discounted rates to 
appointed counsel and public defenders.87  The Team also helps appointed 
defense attorneys obtain competitive rates from other vendors that might 
better meet the attorneys’ needs in particular cases.88  Yet even as the 
federal Defender Services Office is building a more centralized digital 
discovery infrastructure, retained counsel and counsel in state cases are still 
left to navigate the digital storage problem on their own. 
Apart from storage, the processing of digital discovery imposes heavy 
burdens on the parties, particularly the defense.  A typical ESI case is likely 
to have files that originate from different sources and serve distinct 
functions.  The files are likely to be saved in multiple formats, many of 
which require proprietary software to process and review.89  Processing the 
 
 83 See, e.g., Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82; Broderick, supra note 73. 
 84 CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 229. 
 85 Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82; Interview with Jason Hawkins, 
Federal Public Defender, Northern District of Texas, Feb. 5, 2018. 
 86 Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82. 
 87 Defender Services Office, Litigation Services, CJA Panel Attorney Software 
Discounts, https://fd.org/litigation-support/cja-panel-attorney-software-discounts [https://
perma.cc/5GNK-5DWV]. 
 88 Defender Services Office, Litigation Services, Direct Assistance for CJA Panel, 
https://fd.org/litigation-support/direct-assistance-cja-panel [https://perma.cc/LWV5-GRB4]. 
 89 CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 227–28. Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra 
note 82; This occurs frequently because prosecutors are “generally [ . . . ] not the original 
custodian or source of the ESI they produce in discovery.” Joint Working Group On 
2019] MANAGING DIGITAL DISCOVERY 253 
evidence can be expensive and time-consuming.90  As a result, disputes 
frequently arise about the format in which files should be produced and 
about the allocation of responsibility for any reformatting.91 
Rules of criminal procedure remain silent on digital discovery 
mechanics, leaving questions about formatting for the parties and the court 
to decide on an ad hoc basis.92  Some courts have required the prosecution 
to convert voluminous digital evidence into a searchable format, but others 
have refused to impose such a burden on the prosecution in the absence of a 
clear mandate from the rules.93  As a result, the defense may be left with 
processing costs that it cannot fully meet. 
Another important aspect of the formatting decision is whether the 
recipient of the digital files—typically, the defense—would be able to view 
the underlying metadata.  To examine the metadata, a party would need to 
receive the files in their native format.  The producing party may therefore 
need to produce the files in two formats—one that can be searched and one 
that reveals the underlying characteristics of the data.  The producing party 
(typically, the prosecution) may receive files from a third party only in a 
searchable format; to obtain the metadata, it would need to request the third 
party to produce the same files in their native format, occasioning further 
expense and delays.94  Some courts have therefore been reluctant to order 
discovery of metadata, believing that metadata are generally not relevant 
and too burdensome to produce.95  But as many civil case judges have 
recognized, metadata are often needed to authenticate electronic documents, 
understand key features of electronic files (such as the date and location of 
their creation or modification), and sort electronic files (for example, by the 
 
Electronic Technology in the Criminal Justice System, Recommendations for Electronically 
Stored Information Discovery Production in Federal Criminal Cases, Rec. 6 (2012) 
[hereinafter ESI Protocol]. 
 90 See Broderick et al., supra note 45, at 9 (noting further that “there is no software tool 
for producing all discovery in a single, easy-to-use package”). 
 91 See, e.g., State v. Dingman, 202 P.3d 388 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (reversing and 
remanding for new trial where trial court refused to order prosecution to convert mirror 
image of computer drive into a format usable by the defense). 
 92 See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 296 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that 
Rule 16 “is entirely silent on the issue of the form that discovery must take”). 
 93 Andrew D. Goldsmith, Trends—or Lack Thereof—in Criminal E-Discovery: A 
Pragmatic Survey of Recent Case Law, 59 U.S. ATTYS’ BULL. 2 (2011); Hilary Oran, Does 
Brady Have Byte? Adapting Constitutional Disclosure for the Digital Age, 50 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 97, 118 (2016). 
 94 See, e.g., United States v. Budovsky, No. 13 CR 00368 (DLC), 2016 WL 386133, at 
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016). 
 95 Edward J. Imwinkelried & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Tactics for Attorney Seeking 
Production, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY STRATEGY & TACTICS § 9:4 (2017). 
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sender or recipient of emails).96  The information can be critical to a 
criminal case, and courts have to determine when and how to distribute the 
burden of its processing and review. 
In brief, the staggering volume and complexity of digital evidence 
requires significant technological expertise and resources to store and 
process.  In a cash-strapped criminal justice system, this frequently leaves 
both parties—but especially the defense—unable to cope. 
B. REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE 
The next digital discovery challenge concerns the time and resources 
needed to review ESI adequately.  While keyword searches of digital 
documents are generally quick and efficient, they are often imprecise, the 
volume of digital evidence is overwhelming, and certain files, such as 
images, audio, and video files, still require manual review.  These 
difficulties affect both the review of relevant evidence and, more 
problematically, the review of potentially exculpatory evidence. 
1. Reviewing Relevant Evidence 
In some respects, digital documents are easier to review than paper 
ones: Keyword searches enable an attorney to sift more quickly through a 
batch of digital documents than a manual review of the same documents.  
But keyword searching does not solve all problems of digital evidence 
review.  The exponential growth of ESI means that the universe of 
documents to review is significantly larger than it was when evidence was 
primarily saved in paper form.  Moreover, keyword searching is not as 
precise as it might initially appear.  Search terms may be over- or under-
inclusive, particularly as text and social media messages increasingly use 
symbols and abbreviations.97  Cases involving slang, code words, or 
foreign-language conversations pose special challenges.  Attorneys may not 
be able to formulate the proper search terms unless they are familiar with 
“the terms of art [and] the factual background of the case,” and they may 
not know which search protocols to use unless they are technologically 
savvy or have funding for search protocol experts (both of which are rare in 
the field of criminal defense).98  When it comes to image, audio, and video 
files, which are not searchable with currently available technology, the 
 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at § 9:13 (noting further that numerous studies have exposed the limits of keyword 
searching). 
 98 Ken Strutin, Databases, E-Discovery and Criminal Law, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 6, 28 
(2009) (“Searchers must have insight into the language and terms of art, as well as the 
factual background of the case, to even begin formulating the correct queries.”). 
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burden on the defense is especially high.99  As a result of these various 
challenges with reviewing ESI, defense attorneys frequently express 
frustration at having to “sift[] through . . . terabytes of information.”100 
Rules of criminal procedure do little to alleviate the disproportionate 
burdens of reviewing digital evidence.  The Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure require the prosecution to disclose documents that: 1) are 
“material to preparing the defense”; 2) are intended for use in the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief; or 3) have been obtained from a defendant.101  
But the rules do not require the government to specify which of these three 
categories the documents fall in, 102 and they do not require the prosecution 
to identify where in a sizeable production the relevant documents are 
located.103  Indictments also reveal little about the facts that might support 
particular charges.104  In theory, the defense could move for a bill of 
particulars or for “pinpoint discovery” to obtain more detailed information 
about the case, but as long as prosecutors produce evidence in a searchable 
format, courts are likely to deny such motions.105  Even if the prosecution 
 
 99 Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82; see also United States v. Richards, 
659 F.3d 527, 544 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting defense “frustration about the sheer volume of 
images and being ‘swamped with trying to pick the needle out of the haystack’”); United 
States v. Quinones, 2015 WL 6696484, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2015) (acknowledging that 
review of 3,240 hours of continuous video footage from pole camera would require defense 
attorneys to invest thousands of hours); United States v. Sierra, 2012 WL 2866417, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (noting that pole camera videos are not searchable). 
 100 United States v. Vujanic, 2014 WL 3868448, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2014); see 
also Richards, 659 F.3d at 544. Clients may sometimes be able to guide defense attorneys, 
but even they are unlikely to provide a helpful roadmap when the evidence is in the millions 
of pages. As Part IV.D discusses in greater detail, detained defendants face special 
challenges in this process. 
 101 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (1)(a)(E). 
 102 See Robert J. Anello & Richard F. Albert, Coming Changes to Federal Criminal 
Discovery Rule?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 4, 2017. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Letter to Donald W. Molloy, U.S. District Judge, from Roland G. Riopelle, President, 
NYCDL, Peter Goldberger and William Genego, Chairs, NACDL Federal Rules Committee 
(Mar. 1, 2016) [hereinafter NYCDL and NACDL Letter]. 
 105 See, e.g., United States v. Daugherty, 2017 WL 839472, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 28, 
2017) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit has never recognized even extraordinarily dense or voluminous 
discovery as a justification to order a bill of particulars.”); United States v. Huntress, 2015 
WL 631976, at *28 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2015) (denying a motion for a bill of particulars 
where the prosecution “produced 137,000 pages of discovery on DVDs that are ‘readily 
loadable into a searchable format’ and accompanied by an index of these materials”); see 
also United States v. Gonzalez, 2014 WL 2574765, at **1–4 (E.D. Tenn. June 6, 2014) 
(denying motion for pinpoint discovery where the prosecution had taken measures to make 
voluminous discovery more manageable and where pinpoint discovery was not compelled 
by law). But cf. United States v. Chen, 2006 WL 3898177, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2006) 
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has created a tool that could help with review of the evidence (for example, 
a computer program or database that can sort through voluminous records), 
courts will generally deny discovery of such government-created tools, as 
long as the prosecution provides the underlying records to the defense.106 
As a result, defense attorneys can easily become overwhelmed by a 
“discovery dump” in a voluminous ESI case, as a letter from the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers to the Federal Rules Committee 
explained: 
It is now routine in many jurisdictions for defense counsel to receive enormous 
amounts of information at the outset of the discovery process, with relatively little 
guidance as to what might be relevant to the prosecution or defense of the charges 
contained in the indictment . . . . [D]efense counsel are often handed a computer 
hard drive at the first appearance in court, and told that it contains the 
government’s first production of discovery, consisting of millions of pages of 
documentation and thousands of emails culled from the server of a client’s 
employer. Thousands more pages of documentation and emails typically follow 
that first production, and occasionally, more gigabytes of documentation will be 
dropped into defense counsel’s laps on the eve of trial.107 
When prosecutors turn over voluminous digital evidence without any 
guidance on where documents material to the case might be located, 
defense attorneys find it difficult to review the evidence and provide 
adequate assistance to clients in plea negotiations or at trial. 
2. Searching for Brady Evidence 
The expansion of digital evidence also has implications for how 
prosecutors fulfill their constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence to the defense.  Under Brady v. Maryland and its 
progeny, prosecutors have a duty to review evidence within their possession 
carefully to ensure that they have disclosed every item that might be 
exculpatory or impeachment evidence and material to the defense.108   
Prosecutors also have a duty to learn of Brady evidence known to anyone 
 
(granting motion for bill of particulars where discovery included thousands of non-
searchable image, audio, and video files). 
 106 United States v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270, 1282 (10th Cir. 2010); see also United States 
v. McCluskey, 2012 WL 13081295 (D.N.M. May 11, 2012); United States v. Schmidt, 2007 
WL 1232180 (D. Colo. Apr. 25, 2007). 
 107 NYCDL and NACDL Letter, supra note 104; see also Anello & Albert, supra note 
102 (“[T]he ubiquity and growth in volume of electronically stored information have 
exacerbated another longstanding problem: government follow-up productions of large 
quantities of new material on the eve of trial.”). 
 108 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83, 87 (1963). 
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on the government’s investigative team and to disclose that evidence to the 
defense.109 
In cases with massive digital or documentary evidence, prosecutors 
often turn over all the evidence to the defense to ensure that they have not 
mistakenly withheld any Brady evidence.  When this occurs, courts have 
held that the burden of searching for Brady evidence within the gigabytes of 
files produced by the prosecution rests entirely with the defense.110  The 
prosecution has no duty to indicate where within a voluminous production 
Brady evidence might be located.  Some courts have suggested that Brady 
requires the prosecution to at least ensure that digital evidence is provided 
in a searchable format and that the ESI production is not padded “with 
pointless or superfluous information to frustrate a defendant’s review.”111  
But only a few courts have gone further and required the prosecution to 
specifically identify Brady material within a large mass of ESI 
documents.112 
As the previous section discussed, reviewing massive digital evidence 
remains a time-consuming and onerous task.  With respect to images, video, 
and audio files, the reviewing burden is even greater.  Given the limited 
resources of most defense attorneys, relevant evidence may be 
overlooked.113  This undermines the accuracy of criminal adjudication and 
the public interest in uncovering the truth in criminal cases.  When the 
relevant evidence is potentially exculpatory, the fairness of the trial is also 
compromised, and the problem assumes constitutional dimensions.  Yet 
 
 109 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995). 
 110 See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 297 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the prosecution “is under no duty to direct a defendant to exculpatory evidence within a 
larger mass of disclosed evidence”); Oran, supra note 93, at 118 (discussing cases). 
 111 United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 577 (5th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. 
Quinones, 2015 WL 6696484, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2015) (discussing cases and noting 
that “courts have started to recognize that the Government needs to impose at least some 
minimal organization on voluminous discovery to comply with the spirit of its statutory and 
constitutional obligations”). 
 112 E.g., United States v. Blankenship, 2015 WL 3687864 (S.D.W. Va. June 12, 2015); 
United States v. Salyer, 2010 WL 3036444, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2010) (ordering 
identification of Brady material for a detained defendant with limited resources “as a matter 
of case management (and fairness)”); United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 14, 29 (D.D.C. 
1998). 
 113 While so far, courts do not appear to have granted an ineffective assistance claim on 
the grounds that counsel failed to adequately review voluminous discovery, such claims are 
made with regularity by defendants. See, e.g., Martinez v. United States, 2018 WL 3024155, 
at *3 (D.S.C. June 18, 2018) (rejecting claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance by 
not thoroughly reviewing voluminous evidence); Johnson v. United States, 2015 WL 
7169589, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2015) (same); Bieganowski v. United States, 2006 WL 
2259710, at **10, 22 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2006) (same). 
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neither case law nor criminal procedure rules have adequately addressed the 
challenges for the defense in searching for exculpatory evidence within 
gigabytes of electronic documents—and how these can be resolved without 
imposing impractical burdens on the prosecution. 
In certain cases, the intersection of the prosecution’s duty under Brady 
and its duty to protect sensitive information does impose a significant 
reviewing burden on the prosecution.  If prosecutors decide to withhold 
evidence to protect the safety of a witness or to safeguard privileged 
information, they need to examine the protected material carefully to ensure 
that it does not contain Brady evidence.  As explained earlier, this often 
requires manual review in addition to keyword searching of documents, and 
for images, video, and audio files, it always demands time-consuming 
personal review.114  Not surprisingly, some cases that are heavy on both ESI 
and protected information have led to Brady violations by prosecutors.115 
Another complication for prosecutors is that ESI comes from a range 
of sources and may be stored with multiple law enforcement agencies 
working on the case or in different locations within the same agency.  As 
noted previously, prosecutors are responsible for disclosing Brady evidence 
in the custody of law enforcement, even if they are not aware that such 
evidence exists.116  Some prosecutors argue that it is more difficult to 
comply with this duty in ESI cases because the evidence is so voluminous 
and law enforcement agencies’ digital storage practices are frequently 
disorganized and inconsistent.117 
 
 114 Quinones, 2015 WL 6696484, at *3 (ordering annotation of videos produced where 
prosecution produced around 3,240 hours of continuous pole camera footage); United States 
v. Sierra, 2012 WL 2866417, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (noting that pole camera videos 
are not searchable); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 2014 WL 2574765, at *1 (E.D. 
Tenn. June 6, 2014) (rejecting defense motion for pinpoint discovery in a drug-trafficking 
conspiracy case involving thousands of audio- and video-recorded conversations in 
Spanish); United States v. Flores, 2014 WL 1308608, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014) 
(noting the time-consuming nature of discovery review in RICO gang case involving 
hundreds of thousands of documents, 15,800 audio recordings, and 100 videos, many of 
which were heavily redacted to protect the safety of witnesses). 
 115 Transcript, United States v. Bundy, Docket No. 2:16-CR-00046 (D. Nev. Jan. 8, 
2018), at https://www.scribd.com/document/369154834/Transcript-Jan-8-2018 
[https://perma.cc/KR7H-28F4]; see also United States v. Bundy, Government’s Brief 
Opposing Dismissal with Prejudice, Docket No. 2:16-CR-00046 (D. Nev. Feb 17, 2016). 
 116 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995). 
 117 Interview with Assistant District Attorney, Texas, Feb. 1, 2018 (noting that under 
discovery rules, prosecutors have to account for digital police files, but prosecutors don’t 
have a say over how police organize and store their videos; as a result, police might have it 
in several places, and some of the evidence might not make it to the prosecutor in time to be 
properly disclosed). 
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C. PROTECTING PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND SAFETY 
Where a case features information that might compromise witness or 
informant safety, individual privacy, trade secrets, national security, or a 
legal privilege, attorneys have to review the information carefully to ensure 
that it is adequately safeguarded.  Most commonly, this is a problem for the 
prosecution.  But the defense also has legal obligations to protect certain 
private or confidential information when producing its own ESI. 
Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, like Texas, the burden has been shifted 
from the prosecution to defense counsel to redact private and confidential 
information before sharing it with the defendant.118  While this helps ensure 
broader access to relevant information for the defense, in cases with 
voluminous ESI, it also imposes a significant reviewing and redacting 
burden on defense attorneys. 
Once prosecutors or defense counsel have located the information that 
should be protected from disclosure, they must also determine how the 
sensitive information should be safeguarded.  The parties may need to 
discuss with each other any protective orders or other measures that may be 
necessary to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive ESI material.119  
Sensitive and confidential documents may include: “grand jury material, 
witness identifying information, information about informants, a 
defendant’s or co-defendant’s personal or business information, information 
subject to court protective orders, confidential personal or business 
information, or privileged information.”120 
In cases involving child pornography, the parties will also need to 
determine how to conduct discovery without violating laws criminalizing 
the distribution of the material.121  If the law criminalizes copying of child 
 
 118 TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 39.14(f) (2017) (providing that defense attorney must redact 
personal identifying information, such as address, telephone number, driver’s license 
number, social security number, date of birth, and bank account number, before sharing with 
the defendant). 
 119 ESI Protocol, supra note 89, rec. 10. To that end, the parties may need to discuss 
whether “encryption or other security measures during transmission of ESI discovery are 
warranted” and what measures would be taken “to ensure that only authorized persons have 
access to the electronically stored or disseminated discovery materials” and “to ensure the 
security of any website or other electronic repository against unauthorized access,” among 
other issues. Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)(1)–(2)(A) (2018) (requiring that child pornography “remain in 
the care, custody, and control of either the Government or the court” and that 
“[n]otwithstanding Rule 16 . . . a court shall deny . . . any request by the defendant to copy, 
photograph, duplicate, or otherwise reproduce any property or material that constitutes child 
pornography . . . so long as the Government makes the property or material reasonably 
available to the defendant”). 
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pornography even for purposes of discovery (as it does at the federal level), 
the prosecution will typically make the images available to the defense for 
inspection at the prosecutor’s office or other law enforcement facility.122  
But in states where no law criminalizes copying of child pornography for 
purposes of discovery, and discovery rules require the prosecution to 
furnish a copy of the relevant images to the defense upon request,123 other 
measures are needed to protect against unauthorized access.  The parties 
may enter into stipulations, or the prosecution may obtain protective orders 
that require the defense to safeguard the material from any improper 
distribution or viewing.124 
Adequate handling of the security of confidential and sensitive 
evidence—to prevent cyber intrusions and other forms of unauthorized 
access—often requires specialized technical knowledge, which prosecutors 
and defense attorneys are not likely to have on their own.125  And while 
prosecutors may be able to rely on in-house information technology 
specialists to handle these questions, private defense attorneys are unlikely 
to have such experts on staff.  As a result, the question of who should bear 
the burden of ensuring the security, privacy, and confidentiality of the 
information is frequently disputed.  It requires good faith negotiation 
between the parties, and as Part VI elaborates, judicial supervision guided 
by robust rules on digital discovery. 
D. OBTAINING EVIDENCE FROM THIRD PARTIES 
Another complication of digital discovery is that the defense faces 
serious challenges in obtaining electronically stored information that is not 
already in the prosecution’s custody.  Defendants must overcome 
significant legal hurdles in obtaining subpoenas for documents held by third 
parties. Furthermore, individuals or entities who are not parties to the case 
may be reluctant, unavailable, or in some cases legally prohibited from 
sharing the evidence with the defense.  The difficulty of gathering digital 
 
 122 See, e.g., United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 731 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
“[c]hild pornography is illegal contraband” and that therefore Rule 16 does not provide for 
the distribution or copying of the material by the defense); United States v. Husband, 246 F. 
Supp. 2d 467, 469 (E.D. Va. 2003) (same); State v. Ross, 792 So. 2d 699, 701–02 (Fla. App. 
2001) (same). 
 123 See State v. Scoles, 69 A.3d 559, 571 (N.J. 2013) (“A majority of states that have 
considered whether to incorporate the federal approach have determined not to do so, opting 
in favor of procedures requiring the prosecution to reproduce the materials for defendant’s 
use and control in the preparation of a defense.”). 
 124 Susan S. Kreston, Emerging Issues in Internet Child Pornography Cases: Balancing 
Acts, 9 J. INTERNET L. 22, 28 (2006); see also Scoles, 69 A.3d 559. 
 125 See, e.g., CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 228. 
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evidence from third parties worsens the informational asymmetry between 
the prosecution and defense. 
To obtain digital evidence from a third party before trial, the defense 
first has to apply to the district court to subpoena the material; even if the 
subpoena is granted, the person or entity to whom it is addressed can still 
move to quash it.126  Only if the defense succeeds at both stages will the 
subpoena be enforced.   
Courts are split on the standards that apply to subpoenas for 
documentary evidence, known as subpoenas duces tecum.  A few merely 
require the defense to show that the information requested may be “material 
to the defense” and is not unduly oppressive for the requested party to 
produce.127  But other courts demand that the defense meet the stricter 
standard under United States v. Nixon, which was developed for subpoenas 
used by prosecutors and requires the moving party to show: 
(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise 
procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the 
party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in 
advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend 
unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith 
and is not intended as a general ‘fishing expedition.’128 
Following Nixon, many federal courts have limited the type of 
evidence that the defense may obtain through a subpoena duces tecum, 
holding that it may not use a subpoena to gather “pretrial materials that are 
sought solely ‘for purposes of impeachment.’”129  Other courts have 
quashed subpoenas that were perceived as overly broad.130  State courts 
have used similar requirements to constrain the types of evidence that the 
defense can subpoena from private parties.131 
 
 126 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c); Alan Silber & Lin Solomon, A Creative Approach for 
Obtaining Documentary Evidence from Third Parties, CHAMPION, May 2017, at 24, 25. For 
state rules, see, for example, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1326 (2008); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 17(a)(2). 
 127 See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 249 F.R.D. 58, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). See generally 
Silber & Solomon, supra note 126, at 26. 
 128 418 U.S. 683, 699–700 (1974). 
 129 United States v. Baroni, 2015 WL 9049528, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2015) (citing 
United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189, 195 (3d Cir. 1981) and United States v. 
Onyenson, 2013 WL 5322651, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2013)). 
 130 United States v. Rand, 835 F.3d 451, 462–64 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying Nixon criteria 
to uphold district court decision to quash subpoena requesting “accounting entries, budgets, 
budget entries, and financial reports for seven categories of reserve accounts over an eight-
year period — the timeframe of the alleged conspiracy” because the request was overly 
broad). 
 131 See, e.g., State v. Watson, 726 A.2d 214, 216 (Me. 1999) (quoting United States v. 
Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 145 (3rd Cir. 1980)); In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. 
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In some circumstances, the law may impose additional burdens on the 
defense’s efforts to obtain digital information from private parties.  Trade 
secret protections represent one such hurdle, particularly in cases involving 
algorithms or computer programs used to investigate or prosecute 
defendants.  If a private party owns the source code for these computer 
programs, trade secrets may make it difficult and in some cases impossible 
for the defense to gain access to the source code.132  This may prevent 
defendants from questioning the reliability of the digital technology used to 
prosecute them, whether that technology is fingerprint matching, DNA 
matching, ballistic matching, or breathalyzers.133  Trade secrets may also 
impede defendants from obtaining the algorithms behind digital 
surveillance programs, limiting the defense’s ability to challenge the 
legality of the surveillance.134 
Likewise, state and federal privacy laws may prevent private parties 
from sharing certain digital evidence with the defense.  The Stored 
Communications Act (SCA) prohibits service providers from disclosing the 
electronic communications of their clients without either the consent of the 
client or a subpoena, court order, or warrant obtained by a governmental 
entity.135  Because the defendant—even when represented by a public 
defender—is not a governmental entity, he cannot subpoena Internet service 
providers for emails or other electronic communications material to the 
defense’s case. 
When the SCA prevents the service provider from disclosing the 
evidence to the defense, the defense could still subpoena the records 
 
1998) (requiring, among else, that the evidence sought be described with particularity and 
that it be material to the defense, that “the information is not readily available elsewhere” 
and “that the party seeking it is not engaged in a fishing expedition with no focused idea of 
the size, species, or edibility of the fish”); Cty. of Nassau Police Dep’t v. Judge, 237 A.D.2d 
354, 355 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (quashing subpoena because “respondent has 
offered nothing of a particularized nature which would support the claim that the requested 
materials will bear relevant and exculpatory evidence” and holding that “a subpoena may not 
be used to ‘fish for impeaching material’”); Peter Hershey, Discovering Electronically 
Stored Information in Maryland Criminal Cases, MD. B.J., Nov./Dec. 2014, at 50. But cf. 
Harris v. State, 802 S.E.2d 708, 711 (Ga. App. Ct. 2017) (noting that to obtain subpoena, 
defendant must merely establish that documents sought are relevant and material to the 
defense and not unduly oppressive to produce). 
 132 E.g., People v. Super. Ct. (“Chubbs”), 2015 WL 139069 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2015). 
For a discussion of this case and the broader problem of trade secrets preventing the 
disclosure of evidence to criminal defendants, see Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade 
Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018). 
 133 Meghan J. Ryan, Secret Conviction Programs, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2020); Wexler, supra note 132, at 1343, 1358–64. 
 134 Wexler, supra note 132, at 1364–68. 
 135 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2703 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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directly from the senders or recipients of the relevant electronic 
communications.136  But there are several difficulties with this approach.  
First, as discussed earlier, the defense may be limited in using subpoenas to 
obtain evidence from private parties—subpoenas cannot be used merely to 
gather impeachment evidence, the information sought must be specific and 
material to the defense, and the defense must show that other methods of 
obtaining the evidence are not reasonably available.137  It is therefore by no 
means certain that the defense would be able to obtain or enforce a 
subpoena.138 
Second, even if the defense were able to obtain a subpoena, the 
senders or recipients of the electronic communications—particularly if they 
are prosecution witnesses—may be reluctant to cooperate with the defense.  
Those who have the resources to hire an attorney may resist the subpoena 
through a motion to quash or modify its scope.  Even when such litigation 
is not successful, it burdens the defense and drains its resources.  Other 
witnesses may be open to complying, but may have difficulties doing so, as 
they may not be able to hire lawyers or technical experts to guide them in 
the process.139  To aid in this process, the court may order the private party 
to consent to disclosure by the Internet Service Provider; however, this is an 
area of the law that is still developing, and not all courts may realize or 
agree that they have this authority.140  Finally, if the senders or recipients of 
the electronic communications are unavailable, the defense may be left with 
no legal recourse to the data.141 
 
 136 State v. Johnson, 538 S.W.3d 32, 70 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 2016); see also FED. R. 
CRIM P. 17(c). 
 137 See supra notes 126–131 and accompanying text. 
 138 As noted earlier, the defense may have to litigate the subpoena at two stages: when 
the court first decides whether to issue the subpoena, and if the subpoenaed party files a 
motion to quash, when responding to the motion. See supra note 126 and accompanying 
text. 
 139 Cf. Johnson, 538 S.W.3d at 71 (recognizing burdens on witnesses, but finding that in 
the case at hand, subpoenas to witnesses were not unduly onerous). 
 140 See Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (Touchstone), 15 Cal. App. 5th 729, 746 (Ct. App. 
2017). The case is currently being considered by the California Supreme Court, and one of 
the questions presented is: “Does the trial court have authority, pursuant to statutory and/or 
inherent power to control litigation before it and to insure fair proceedings, to order the 
victim witness (or any other listed witness), on pain of sanctions, to either (a) comply with a 
subpoena served on him or her, seeking disclosure of the sought communications subject to 
in camera review and any appropriate protective or limiting conditions, or (b) consent to 
disclosure by provider Facebook subject to in camera review and any appropriate protective 
or limiting conditions?” Facebook, Inc. v. S.C. (Touchstone), 408 P.3d 406 (Cal. 2018). 
 141 Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 443, 445 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2015), 
review granted and opinion superseded sub nom. Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (Hunter), 362 
P.3d 430 (Cal. 2015); Andrew Cohen, How Social Media Giants Side with Prosecutors in 
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While the defense has to abide by strict subpoena requirements in 
gathering digital evidence from private parties, and often faces additional 
legal and practical difficulties in obtaining such evidence, the prosecution 
retains significantly broader investigative authority.  It can collect a wide 
range of evidence from third parties through grand jury subpoenas, as well 
as through searches and seizures.  Because of the superior investigative 
authority of the prosecution, when the defense comes up short in its efforts 
to gather the information from third parties, its only option might be to 
request the prosecution to assist it in obtaining the information.142  But the 
defense may be reluctant to do this out of concern about revealing its trial 
strategy.  Furthermore, the prosecution has no legal duty to assist the 
defense in obtaining such evidence, so a request may remain unanswered.143 
The imbalance of investigative powers in obtaining evidence from 
private parties exacerbates the broader informational and resource 
disparities between the defense and prosecution in criminal cases.  As 
subsequent sections discuss, in the interests of justice and due process, 
courts may occasionally need to intervene to help the defense in obtaining 
digital evidence in the hands of private parties. 
E. PROVIDING DIGITAL DISCOVERY TO DETAINED DEFENDANTS 
Another important challenge for defense attorneys handling digital 
discovery in criminal cases is that their client may be prevented from 
helping them review digital documents if he or she is detained.  In a case 
with voluminous electronic documents, consultation with the client is 
especially important to help the attorney prepare for trial in a timely and 
 
Criminal Cases, Jan. 15, 2018, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/01/15/how-social-
media-giants-side-with-prosecutors-in-criminal-cases [https://perma.cc/A6XM-BQY7]. The 
defendant may also be left without access to the ESI if the account holder invokes her 
privilege against self-incrimination when asked to authenticate an electronic communication. 
Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (Hunter), Real Parties Lee Sullivan and Derrick Hunter’s 
Opening Brief on the Merits, 2016 WL 284305, at *5 (Jan. 15, 2016). 
 142 Cf. Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 417 P.3d 725, 731 (Cal. 2018) (noting that social 
media service providers encouraged defendants to “work[] with the prosecutor to obtain” the 
requested ESI via search warrant). 
 143 See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 648 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that the 
prosecution “had no duty to . . . conduct the defense’s investigation for it” and thus no duty 
to direct third party “to create and run programs to extract data from its database that would 
be useful to the defense”); United States v. Baker, 1 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(“Certainly, Brady does not require the government to conduct discovery on behalf of the 
defendant.”); United States v. Lujan, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (D.N.M. 2008) (noting that 
the prosecution does not have a duty “to seek out information that is not in its or its agents’ 
possession”). 
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adequate fashion.144  The client’s input is needed both to assess evidence 
disclosed by the prosecution and to review evidence that the defense needs 
to produce.145 
Yet detention centers limit inmates’ access to computers and the 
Internet, and this hampers the ability of detained defendants to review 
digital documents relevant to their case.146  These limitations are based in 
part on financial constraints and in part on concerns about security.147  
Because of the restrictions on computer and Internet use by inmates, 
defense attorneys typically bring their own computers to the detention 
center when they meet with clients.148  This approach, however, is 
cumbersome, inadequate, and inefficient.  It is cumbersome because the 
defense attorneys may have to have their laptops “certified” for use in the 
detention centers.149  It is inadequate because it leaves inmates with very 
limited time to review documents.150  And it is inefficient because it 
requires counsel to travel to the detention center and then spend hours there 
for the client to read through massive files. 
Consider the difficulties experienced by the defense in United States v. 
Henderson, where the defendant and his counsel had to compete with other 
attorneys for one of three meeting rooms, and visiting hours were “limited 
to three hours per evening, five days per week.” 151  When Henderson and 
his counsel were able to claim a room, the visits consisted of counsel 
“watching defendant while he reads one document at a time.”152 
 
 144 Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82. 
 145 John McEnany & Donna Lee Elm, Delivering E-Discovery to Federal Pretrial 
Detainees, 32 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2017, at 49, 59 (noting that “the defense may produce 
sizeable e-discovery as well that its client must review” and that this poses special problems 
because detention facilities want to accept discovery only from the government as a result of 
security concerns). 
 146 Id. at 49 (noting that many detention facilities have a policy against Internet access 
and have security concerns about providing computer access to unattended detainees). 
 147 Id. (noting concerns that “almost any device introduced into the facility could be 
weaponized” and concerns about the personnel needed to escort detainees to and from 
discovery review rooms, as well as to log, distribute, and maintain digital devices). 
 148 Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82; Interview with Jason Hawkins, 
supra note 85. 
 149 Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82; Interview with Jason Hawkins, 
supra note 85. 
 150 See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 2016 WL 7377118, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 20, 
2016); McEnany & Elm, supra note 145, at 49. 
 151 Henderson, 2016 WL 7377118, at *3. 
 152 Id. To address the problem, the court granted the defendant’s request to permit the 
defendant to “retain copies of non-victim, substantive witness interview reports only.” Id. at 
*4. 
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Recognizing the persistent difficulties that cases with ESI and pretrial 
detainees present, in 2016, the Joint Electronic Technology Working Group 
(a group of federal prosecutors, defense attorneys, and magistrate judges 
charged with developing best practices to the management of digital 
discovery) published Guidance for the Provision of ESI to Detainees.153  
The group failed to come up with a definitive solution to the problem of 
delivering digital discovery to detainees.  It acknowledged that detention 
centers have varying capacities to accommodate review of digital evidence 
and that inmates have different needs based on the size and complexity of 
digital evidence in their cases.154  Accordingly, the Guidance simply urged 
“a spirit of cooperation.”155  To facilitate such cooperation, the Guidance 
authors proposed the creation of “points of contact” in each of the 
institutions involved (defense, prosecution, Marshals Service, jail, and the 
court).156  The Guidance recommended that these persons work as a 
committee to develop best practices for providing digital discovery to 
detainees and then to negotiate solutions on a case-by-case basis as 
needed.157 
V. NEGOTIATING CRIMINAL DISCOVERY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
A. NEGOTIATION PRACTICE 
As discussed earlier, rules of criminal procedure are generally silent on 
digital discovery obligations in criminal cases.  Courts have also been 
relatively slow to address the concerns raised by digital evidence.  As a 
result, the parties have responded to the complexity, volume, and cost of 
digital discovery primarily by negotiating solutions with each other.  This 
Part provides examples of the forms that such cooperation can take, then 
analyzes the incentives of prosecutors and defense attorneys to cooperate in 
digital discovery, as well as the limits to such cooperation. 
Several sources suggest that cooperation and negotiation about digital 
discovery is already occurring in criminal cases.  First, published and 
unpublished judicial opinions provide some evidence of cooperation.  
While such opinions are typically issued when negotiations between the 
parties fail (hence the need for the court to intervene), the description of the 
interactions preceding the dispute often recounts cooperative behavior. 
 
 153 McEnany & Elm, supra note 145, at 49. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 50. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
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For example, in United States v. Farkas, a securities fraud case 
involving “monumental discovery,” the appeals court found that the district 
court had not abused its discretion in denying a fourth motion for a 
continuance of the trial.158  In justifying this conclusion, the appeals court 
noted that the “[g]overnment had provided considerable assistance to 
defense counsel in reviewing documentary discovery production, including 
instituting an open file policy and holding regular meetings.”159 
Likewise, in United States v. Shafer, which involved 200 terabytes 
seized from 600 computers and 10,000 pieces of paper, prosecutors 
“provided searchable copies of certain documents and [] met individually 
with counsel for the defendants to recommend where counsel [sic] focus 
their review efforts.  For example, the government [] suggested which hard 
drive or drives counsel should search.  Defense attorneys [were] also [] 
provided copies of the electronic storage devices.”160  The court pointed to 
this assistance as a reason for denying a defense motion for pinpoint 
discovery (i.e., a motion for the government to pinpoint data relevant to the 
case).161 
Similarly, in United States v. Santiago, a case concerning cocaine 
trafficking in Pennsylvania and Puerto Rico, the government produced, 
inter alia, audio copies of 1,329 intercepted Spanish-language calls 
pertinent to the charges, as well as electronic copies of English-language 
written summaries of those calls.  The government further offered to 
provide electronic copies of English-language verbatim transcripts of the 
approximately 200 calls it intended to offer at trial.162  The prosecution 
refused to provide such transcripts for the remaining 1,129 pertinent calls, 
however, until finally ordered by the court.163  This case lends support to 
the idea that cooperation is more likely to occur in the shadow of judicial 
intervention, a point discussed further below in Part V.B. 
In United States v. Shabudin, the prosecution provided the defense 
with access to a government-created database containing ESI relevant to the 
case and access to project managers who could assist the defense with the 
database.164  Scores of other cases point to various efforts by the 
 
 158 United States v. Farkas, 474 F. App’x 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 159 Id. 
 160 United States v. Shafer, 2011 WL 977891, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2011). 
 161 Id. 
 162 United States v. Santiago, 2013 WL 1688865, at *12–13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2013). 
 163 Id. at *13. 
 164 United States v. Shabudin, 2014 WL 1379717 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2014). 
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prosecution to help the defense process voluminous ESI.165  Some also offer 
examples of judges prodding the parties to confer about digital discovery.166 
Another source suggesting a turn toward cooperation is the ESI 
Protocol, developed by a joint working group of federal prosecutors and 
public defenders to address the challenges of digital evidence.  The Protocol 
promotes a “collaborative approach to ESI discovery involving mutual and 
interdependent responsibilities.”167  It recommends that the parties meet and 
confer to discuss “the nature, volume, and mechanics of producing ESI 
discovery.”168  It also encourages the parties to “make good faith efforts to 
discuss and resolve disputes over ESI discovery . . . before seeking judicial 
resolution of an ESI discovery dispute.”169  Although the ESI Protocol is 
not yet well-known among practitioners and is therefore rarely followed, its 
recommendations reflect a belief by federal prosecutors and defense 
attorneys that cooperation by the parties is not only possible, but also 
desirable to manage the intricacies of digital discovery in criminal cases. 
When the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules recently discussed 
and adopted amendments to the federal rules to address digital discovery, 
consensus again developed around a collaborative approach.  Defense 
attorneys, prosecutors, and judges who took part in the Committee’s 
 
 165 See, e.g., United States v. Meredith, 2015 WL 5570033, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 
2015) (noting that the prosecution provided the defendant with term-searchable discovery, a 
separate hard drive containing document and email files from imaged hard drives, and 
“written and oral assistance in regard to finding specific documents . . . including a color-
coded and categorized Media Review Index”); United States v. Mohammad, 2012 WL 
1605472, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 8, 2012) (noting that the prosecution provided the defense 
with a hard drive containing ESI in searchable format with indices and with instructions on 
how to navigate the hard drive to review the discovery); United States v. Slade, 2011 WL 
5291757, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2011) (detailing several attempts by prosecution to assist 
the defense with voluminous ESI); see also Claud, supra note 80, at 139. 
 166 United States v. Haymond, 2009 WL 3029592, at **3–4 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 16, 2009) 
(in mediating dispute about sizeable discovery of alleged child pornography, the court 
directed the prosecution to produce additional redacted images for use by the defendant at 
government facility and urged the parties to cooperate in order to expedite any additional 
digital discovery). Cf. General Order Regarding Best Practices for Electronic Discovery of 
Documentary Materials in Criminal Cases, G.O. 09-05, at 1 (W.D. Okla. 2009) (noting that 
“[o]pen communication between the government and defense counsel is critical to ensure 
that discovery is handled and completed in a manner agreeable to all parties”); N.J. CT. R. 
3:9–1(c) (requiring prosecutor and defense counsel to “confer and attempt to reach 
agreement on any discovery issues, including any issues pertaining to discovery provided 
through the use of CD, DVD, e-mail, internet or other electronic means”). 
 167 ESI Protocol, supra note 89. 
 168 Id. at principle 3 (“At the outset of a case, the parties should meet and confer about 
the nature, volume, and mechanics of producing ESI discovery. Where the ESI discovery is 
particularly complex or produced on a rolling basis, an ongoing dialogue may be helpful.”). 
 169 Id. at principle 9. 
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deliberations noted that a cooperative approach has worked in a number of 
cases, when the parties have relied on the ESI Protocol or when the judge 
has prodded the parties to meet and confer.170  Participants therefore 
lamented that not enough prosecutors and defense attorneys were aware of 
the ESI Protocol.171  They further reported that “once the parties get 
together and actually consult the ESI Protocol, discovery goes very 
smoothly.”172  Furthermore, defense attorneys, who were the stakeholders 
most vocal about the challenges of e-discovery, “strongly supported the 
idea that the parties know the case better than the court does.”173  
Participants at the Committee meeting generally agreed that the parties 
“ought to take the first look at the case and talk to each other about whether 
the case warrants some departure from the rules that would normally 
apply.”174 
After extensive consultation and discussion, committee members 
concluded that the best approach to digital discovery in criminal cases is not 
more detailed regulation, but rather encouragement of negotiations among 
the parties.175  Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.1 therefore 
mandates that the parties meet and confer about discovery shortly after 
arraignment.176  At this meeting, the parties would discuss common digital 
discovery challenges, such as the type and format of discovery and the 
timeline for production.  If the parties anticipate that discovery will take a 
long time to review, they may request the court to grant them a continuance 
to prepare adequately for trial.177 
Conversations with several state and federal practitioners in Dallas 
confirm that informal discussions and negotiations about the scope, format, 
 
 170 Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, Sept. 19, 2016, at 11, in Advisory 
Committee on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 28, 2017, at 29 (“Complex 
cases come to [a judge’s] attention regularly by motions, filed primarily by defense 
attorneys, asking him to designate a case as complex for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act. 
The motion is invariably accompanied by a request for a case management conference. [The 
judge] orders the parties to work this out, they provide their agreement, and he tweaks a 
bit.”). 
 171 Beale and King Memorandum, supra note 1, at 167. 
 172 Id. at 168. 
 173 Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, April 28, 2017, at 20, in Advisory 
Committee on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., October 24, 2017, at 38. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 24 (“[D]efense attorneys at the mini conference expressed concern that they 
were not able to get Assistant U.S. Attorneys to talk to them, and that they needed some sort 
of push from the rules.”). 
 176 See Draft Rule 16.1, supra note 22. 
 177 Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, April 28, 2017, at 23, in Advisory 
Committee on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., October 24, 2017, at 41. 
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and timing of digital discovery are common in cases with massive digital 
evidence.178  As one defense attorney explained, “Once we get together, 
we’re wading into the problem; parties are generally agreeable.  Everyone 
is just taken aback by how long it’s taking.”179 
B. COOPERATION INCENTIVES 
Legal scholarship has long recognized that criminal law practice is not 
purely adversarial, but rather has significant cooperative aspects.180  A well-
known 1970s study by James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob of felony case 
dispositions in three U.S. cities famously concluded that “negotiation is the 
most commonly used technique in criminal courtrooms.”181  As the authors 
explained, “continuances and the date of hearings are often bargained; the 
exchange of information is also commonly negotiated.”182  Other empirical 
studies have also found frequent cooperation and negotiation between the 
prosecution and the defense on a host of procedural questions in criminal 
cases.183  These studies conclude that prosecutors and defense attorneys 
 
 178 All but one of the interviews for this project were conducted in person in Dallas, 
where the author is based. Dallas is a fitting place to explore the challenges of digital 
discovery because its federal courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys handle many 
complex cases featuring large amounts of digital discovery and have had to devise solutions 
to the problems that have arisen. The storage and processing of digital data at the Federal 
Public Defender’s Office, discussed earlier, is one such pioneering solution. 
 179 Interview with Jason Hawkins, supra note 85; see also CARDONE REPORT, supra note 
71, at 229 (noting that “[m]any U.S. Attorneys work with defense attorneys to ensure that 
discovery is produced in accessible, searchable formats”). 
 180 See, e.g., MALCOLM FEELEY, PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 270–74 (1979); MILTON 
HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE 
ATTORNEYS 84, 90–91, 117–26 (1977) (describing how new defense attorneys and 
prosecutors over time adopt a less adversarial and more cooperative posture); Abraham S. 
Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a 
Profession, 1 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 15, 24 (1967); Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. 
Wright, Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1445, 1475 (2016) (noting that 
“the repeat-player nature of the relationships in criminal law practice-working together in 
one courthouse, over and over-may move some aspects of the negotiation away from 
competitive to a necessarily more cooperative strategy”); Jackson B. Battle, Comment, In 
Search of the Adversary System—The Cooperative Practices of Private Criminal Defense 
Attorneys, 50 TEX. L. REV. 60, 111–12 (1971). 
 181 JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 32 (1977). 
 182 Id. 
 183 See, e.g., HEUMANN, supra note 180, at 84–91; Alschuler, supra note 26, at 56; Battle, 
supra note 180, at 67; Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Cooperating or Caving in: Are Defense 
Attorneys Shrewd or Exploited in Plea Bargaining Negotiations?, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 145 
(2007). 
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cooperate and negotiate to resolve cases more rapidly,184 to reduce 
uncertainty,185 and to maintain friendly relations in a field of repeat 
players.186  In interviews, defense attorneys have admitted that contacts and 
relationships with other criminal justice actors are at least as important as 
knowing the law.187  As one defense attorney averred, “Your relationships 
with the D.A.’s office will help a hundred times out of a hundred.”188  To 
retain that good relationship and the benefits that come with it, defense 
attorneys frequently refrain from aggressive litigation tactics and instead 
turn to cooperation and accommodation.189 
While the cooperative aspects of criminal law practice in general are 
well-recognized, discovery itself is often described as an adversarial 
competition—a game of hide and seek.190  A few scholars have recognized, 
however, that cooperation also occurs with respect to discovery, typically as 
part of the broader give and take of plea bargaining.  Discovery concessions 
may be granted by prosecutors to receive a guilty plea or cooperation from 
the defendant and by defense attorneys to obtain more lenient treatment in 
the case.191  Discovery favors may also be exchanged more broadly to 
demonstrate reasonableness and maintain friendly relations in repeat-player 
relationships.192 
 
 184 EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 181, at 32; FEELEY, supra note 180, at 271–72. 
 185 EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 181, at 32. 
 186 Id. at 33; FEELEY, supra note 180, at 272; see also Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, 
Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 115, 
145 (1997) (noting that “criminal law is a specialty, and repeat players are frequent, despite 
high turnover in prosecutorial offices”). 
 187 Battle, supra note 180, at 67. 
 188 Id. 
 189 HEUMANN, supra note 180, at 84–91. 
 190 See, e.g., Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, Defendants Seek: The Erosion of Brady 
Through the Defendant Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. REV. 138 (2012). 
 191 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 
YALE L.J. 1179, 1225–29 (1975); Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice 
System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 83–85, 109 
(2015). 
 192 WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMON 
PRACTICES 51 (1985) (finding that “prosecutors will make the discovery procedures more 
cumbersome for certain defense attorneys whom they disliked or distrusted”); Alschuler, 
supra note 191, at 1225 (“Recent studies indicate . . . that the benefit of informal discovery 
results not from an attorney’s position as a public defender but simply from the attorney’s 
personal relationship with individual prosecutors.”); see also BRUCE FREDERICK & DON 
STEMEN, ANATOMY OF DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS OF PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING—
TECHNICAL REPORT 102 (2012) (reporting prosecutor statements that a better relationship 
with a defense attorney would result in a “better flow of information and a more just 
resolution of a case”). 
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The same cooperative dynamics also exist in negotiations about the 
discovery of digital evidence.  But what is notable about cases with massive 
ESI is that the volume, cost, and complexity of digital discovery place 
additional pressure on the parties to cooperate, simply as a way of 
managing the discovery process itself (rather than as a means of obtaining 
concessions in other areas).  The following two sections review in greater 
detail the incentives for prosecutors and defense attorneys to cooperate with 
each other in e-discovery. 
1. Prosecutorial Incentives 
Prosecutors may grant a range of concessions to the defense in the 
process of digital discovery.  For example, they might provide broader 
discovery than required under the rules.193  To assist the defense in 
reviewing the data, prosecutors can also produce the documents in a 
searchable format accessible to the defense and provide an index or a list of 
“hot documents” to help the defense locate material evidence.194  In some 
cases, prosecutors may help the defense obtain evidence from third parties 
or provide the defense with official translations of relevant documents.195 
Several factors might prompt the prosecution to grant such favors.  
The principal incentive is the desire to resolve the case more quickly and at 
a lesser cost.196  As Part III discussed, digital discovery is voluminous and 
costly to sort, redact, produce, and review.  It takes up a significant portion 
of prosecutors’ time and slows down the resolution of cases.197  
Cooperation can move the case at a faster pace and lower cost because it 
educates the prosecution about the defense’s needs and preferences and 
reduces the risk that the defense will file motions with the court to contest 
the format, timing, or scope of discovery.198  Cooperation can also advance 
the proceedings by helping the parties focus on the most important issues in 
dispute.  Finally, it can expedite the case because earlier discovery gives 
both parties a better understanding of the case.  Accordingly, if the 
defendant sees overwhelming incriminating evidence against him, he may 
 
 193 See, e.g., FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra note 192, at 102; HEUMANN, supra note 180, 
at 69–75; Battle, supra note 180, at 68–70. 
 194 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 195 See supra notes 143, 162–165, and accompanying text. 
 196 See Schneider, supra note 183, at 157 (“Problem-solving behavior could also result 
from the clear need to settle cases and move work along.”). 
 197 See McConkie, supra note 51, at 70–71. 
 198 Cf. HEUMANN, supra note 180, at 69–75 (reporting results of study finding that 
prosecutors are more generous with discovery toward defense attorneys who are less 
adversarial and file fewer motions). 
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enter a guilty plea more quickly; conversely, if the defense highlights 
weaknesses in the prosecution’s case early on, the prosecution may agree to 
dismiss some or all of the charges. 
The prosecution may also help the defense with discovery to reduce 
the risk that the court will intervene and render decisions that hurt the 
prosecution.  For instance, if the prosecution is not accommodating defense 
requests to produce ESI in a particular format or in a certain time frame, 
and as a result the defense is unable to review the discovery in time to 
prepare for trial, the defense may ask the court to dismiss the case on 
Speedy Trial grounds.  Consider the example of United States v. Graham, a 
tax fraud case involving approximately 1.5 million documents, 300 
videotapes, 500 recorded conversations, 90 hard drives of computers, and 
3,000 diskettes.199  The court dismissed the indictment without prejudice for 
a Speedy Trial violation because the prosecution produced an 
unmanageable amount of discovery on a rolling basis: 
One, the volume of discovery in this case quite simply has been unmanageable for 
defense counsel. Two, like a restless volcano, the government periodically spews 
forth new discovery, which adds to defense counsels’ already monumental due 
diligence responsibilities. Three, the discovery itself has often been tainted or 
incomplete. For example, during oral argument, counsel for Defendants stated that 
computer hard drives produced by the government were riddled with bugs and 
viruses and that tape recordings and transcriptions were missing or incomplete.200 
Dismissals for speedy trial violations under such circumstances are 
rare—in large part because the parties can avoid the problem ahead of time 
by asking that the court designate the case as complex.201  Some courts have 
held expressly that voluminous discovery makes a case more complex and 
cuts against a finding of a Speedy Trial violation.202 
While a “complex case” designation may help reduce the risk of a 
subsequent speedy trial violation, it does not entirely eliminate it.  The 
avoidance of this risk is an important motivator for the prosecution to 
cooperate with the defense in managing massive ESI discovery.  The ESI 
Protocol recognizes this possibility and urges the parties to “determine how 
 
 199 United States v. Graham, 2008 WL 2098044, at *5 (S.D. Ohio May 16, 2008). 
 200 Id. 
 201 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2012); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 8.2(a)(3); D. NEV. LOCAL R. 
CRIM. P. 16-1. For an example of a court denying a speedy trial claim, despite delays due to 
extensive discovery of ESI, see United States v. Bravata, 636 F. App’x 277, 289–90 (6th Cir. 
2016); see also United States v. Qadri, 2010 WL 933752, at **4–6 (D. Haw. Mar. 9, 2010). 
 202 See, e.g., United States v. Baugh, 605 F. App’x 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2015) (“The sheer 
size and complexity of this sprawling gang case—featuring ten indictments, numerous 
defendants, voluminous discovery, over 1,800 pretrial docket entries—accounts for most of 
its length, which ‘favors a finding of no constitutional violation.’”). 
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to ensure that any ‘meet and confer’ process does not run afoul of speedy 
trial deadlines.”203 
Another reason why prosecutors may cooperate with the defense is to 
avoid claims of Brady violations.  Prosecutors may provide open-file 
discovery to preempt such claims (though as noted earlier, that may only 
compound the difficulty of reviewing digital discovery in time to prepare 
for trial).204  But in cases where prosecutors need to protect informants, 
witnesses, or other confidential or privileged information, they may benefit 
from cooperating with the defense to ensure that the evidence they are 
withholding is not potentially exculpatory.  Consultation with the defense 
about how to handle sensitive information could help prosecutors avoid a 
collapse of the case as a result of unintentional failure to disclose 
impeachment or exculpatory evidence.205 
Another common reason for prosecutors to help the defense with 
digital discovery is to reduce the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims that may jeopardize a conviction and cause them to have to re-
litigate a case.206   As digital information becomes a standard element of 
criminal cases, but defense attorneys frequently lack the technical 
competence or resources to process it properly, claims of ineffective 
assistance are likely to rise.207   When prosecutors see an attorney who is 
overwhelmed by massive discovery and does not have the resources or 
competence to assist the client adequately, they may ask investigative 
agents to help the attorney with processing the evidence, or they may 
produce indices or lists of hot documents to guide the defense with its 
review.208 
 
 203 ESI Protocol, supra note 89, rec. 5. 
 204 Interview with Jason Hawkins, supra note 85. 
 205 United States v. Bundy is an example of a case with voluminous ESI, including audio 
and video evidence, which prosecutors did not properly disclose because of concerns about 
sensitive evidence. The failure to disclose Brady material led to a dismissal of the case. Such 
failures are more likely to be avoided if the parties discuss e-discovery in good faith. See 
Transcript, United States v. Bundy, Docket No. 2:16-CR-00046 (D. Nev. Jan. 8, 2018), at 
https://www.scribd.com/document/369154834/Transcript-Jan-8-2018 
[https://perma.cc/ZH34-JQUC]; United States v. Bundy, Government’s Brief Opposing 
Dismissal with Prejudice, Docket No. 2:16-CR-00046 (D. Nev. Feb 17, 2016). 
 206 Shara Saget, See Something, Say Something?, 44 PROSECUTOR J. 3 (2014); Andrea L. 
Westerfeld, Preventing Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 41 PROSECUTOR J. 4 
(2011). 
 207 See Brandon L. Garrett, Big Data and Due Process, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 
207, 215 (2014). 
 208 See, e.g., United States v. Budovsky, No. 13 CR 00368 (DLC), 2016 WL 386133, at 
*10, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016) (noting that the government “has promptly responded to 
every defense request for assistance and sent law enforcement personnel to the defense to 
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Some prosecutors may also cooperate on digital discovery with the 
defense as a matter of professional integrity and courtesy, reflecting a 
vision of the prosecutor’s role as a “minister of justice.”209   An office 
culture that encourages a cooperative approach to disclosure can likewise 
have an important influence on prosecutors’ choices.210  And as with 
cooperation in criminal cases overall, prosecutors may cooperate to remain 
on friendly terms with defense attorneys with whom they frequently 
work.211  A friendly relationship ensures that defense attorneys do not 
overwhelm prosecutors with motions and trials.  It also makes the practice 
of criminal law more pleasant for the attorneys involved. 
But above all, prosecutors are likely to negotiate digital discovery 
procedures with the defense in order to avoid more onerous orders from the 
court.212  Some district judges, for example, in the Southern and Eastern 
Districts of New York, frequently enter pretrial orders requiring 
certification of substantial disclosure from the prosecution, an index of 
materials produced, tentative exhibit lists, and copies of exhibits.213  In 
districts where judges are expected to take a more active role in the case of 
discovery disputes, the prosecution may prefer to settle any disputes 
informally with the defense rather than invite judicial management of 
digital discovery.214 
 
assist it with technical issues” and that it has “explained in detail which items of discovery 
supported the allegations in the Indictment”); United States v. Shafer, 2011 WL 977891, at 
*5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2011) (observing that the government “conducted personal discovery 
sessions with the defense attorneys to highlight specific evidence relevant to each defendant 
and where to find it in the discovery”). Prosecutors have acknowledged providing broader 
discovery and other assistance to the defense as a means of avoiding subsequent claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Westerfeld, supra note 206, at 4. 
 209 Cf. Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 
56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1093–94 (1066) (finding that more experienced prosecutors tend to 
be more understanding of defense attorneys’ function and are therefore more cooperative); 
Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context, in LAWYERS IN 
PRACTICE 269, 288–89 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (discussing how 
prosecutors’ individual philosophies and personalities shape disclosure decisions). 
 210 See Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 209, at 279–84. 
 211 See, e.g., id. at 278 (discussing interview results finding that prosecutors “maintain 
generous disclosure practices to build cooperative relationships with defense lawyers”). 
 212 Cf. id. at 278 (discussing interview findings that “[i]n jurisdictions in which the court 
exercises some authority over the discovery process—either informally or pursuant to court 
rules—prosecutors appear to be more diligent in complying with their obligations in gray 
areas”). 
 213 NYCDL and NACDL Letter, supra note 104. 
 214 See, e.g., United States v. Shabudin, 2014 WL 1379717 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 
2014) (faced with a hearing on a motion to compel discovery, the prosecution voluntarily 
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2. Defense Incentives 
Defense attorneys are motivated to cooperate with prosecutors 
primarily to obtain favorable treatment of their clients, such as a dismissal 
or reduction of the charges or a more lenient sentence.215  They may also be 
accommodating in order to obtain some of the prosecutorial concessions 
discussed in the previous section, such as access to broader and more 
accessible discovery.216  Such concessions allow the defense to better 
prepare for plea negotiations or trial and move the case along more quickly, 
ultimately benefitting the client.  If the client is detained, a swifter 
resolution may also mean quicker release.217 
Defense attorneys have publicly lamented the burdens of ESI review 
and advocated for greater assistance from the prosecution in ESI-heavy 
cases.  They have emphasized how overwhelmed they are by the volume of 
evidence in ESI cases. 218  As some shared with the Advisory Committee on 
Criminal Rules, “when you have hundreds of thousands of tapes and 
gigabytes of data with no index, and you do not know what evidence the 
government is going to use to prove its case, it is impossible for the 
defendant to figure out the defense.”219  To comb through voluminous ESI, 
therefore, defense attorneys may ask for “discovery indices and ‘hot 
document’ lists,” notice about when discovery will be substantially 
 
agreed to provide defense with access to ESI database and technical assistance with the 
database). 
 215 See Schneider, supra note 183, at 158–59 (noting that sentencing reductions are a key 
incentive for defense attorneys to be cooperative in hopes of obtaining a favorable plea 
bargain for their client). 
 216 See, e.g., HEUMANN, supra note 180, at 69; see also Battle, supra note 180, at 68 
(finding that some defense attorneys believe that a more cooperative approach gives them 
broader access to the state’s evidence—in the words of one defense attorney, “If 
[prosecutors] like you and you are cooperative, you can get access to their files for the 
asking”). 
 217 Interview with Defense Attorney #1, October 10, 2017, Dallas, TX, 2017; see also 
Schneider, supra note 183, at 160. 
 218 Interview with Defense Attorney #1, supra note 217 (“Many lawyers feel 
overwhelmed by this. Some become obsessive about it.”). In cases with retained counsel, 
“[c]lients often can’t pay for thorough review of the evidence disclosed.” Id. The financial 
limitations in cases with appointed counsel are even greater. See, e.g., United States v. 
Sierra, 2012 WL 2866417, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (discussing limited resources of 
appointed counsel to review discovery); cf. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT 
DEF., AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR 
EQUAL JUSTICE 19 (2004) (noting that as a result of poor funding and excessive caseloads, 
“in many cases, indigent defense attorneys fail to fully conduct investigations [and] prepare 
their cases . . . .”). 
 219 Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, Sept. 19, 2016, at 9, in Advisory Committee 
on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 28, 2017, at 27. 
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completed, production of trial exhibit lists, witness lists, and “early 
disclosure of witness-related material.”220 
To obtain cooperation from the prosecution, the defense may agree not 
to file discovery motions (for broader discovery, earlier discovery, or 
discovery in a different format) or other pretrial motions (for a bill of 
particulars, for continuance of the case, or to dismiss the indictment on the 
grounds of a Speedy Trial violation).221  More controversially, defense 
attorneys might occasionally disclose more information about their client’s 
case than they are legally required to share with the prosecution.222  In 
general, the defense may make its demands less aggressively in an effort to 
maintain a harmonious relationship with the prosecution and ultimately 
help the client.223 
In some cases, the defense might further agree to a waiver of any 
evidence yet to be obtained by the prosecution.  Such waivers have been 
documented in Texas, where a recent law requires prosecutors to provide 
open-file discovery.224  One Texas defense attorney speculated (without 
condoning the practice) that the defense may agree to such waivers where a 
client is detained and seeks to resolve the case more quickly, or where the 
attorney is paid per case: 
Police departments can be slow uploading body camera evidence (downloaded to a 
police digital platform, but then queued to upload to D.A.’s platform). If the client 
is anxious to plead to get probation, that may be a reason to agree to a discovery 
waiver. Also, court-appointed defense attorneys get paid if a case is disposed—
that might be a reason to agree to a discovery waiver.225 
Decisions to forego filing a motion or to waive discovery rights 
represent more problematic concessions than those concerning the format 
of discovery.  This is especially the case where discovery waivers are 
 
 220 Anello & Albert, supra note 102. 
 221 See HEUMANN, supra note 180, at 53–57, 61–69, 90; Alschuler, supra note 26, at 56; 
Battle, supra note 180, at 73–74. 
 222 Battle, supra note 180, at 76–78. 
 223 Id. at 100–01. 
 224 TEXAS APPLESEED & TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, TOWARDS MORE TRANSPARENT 
JUSTICE: THE MICHAEL MORTON ACT’S FIRST YEAR 31–35 (2015). In Dallas, plea 
agreements in felony cases since at least 2014 now include the following standard language: 
“Understanding that I have these rights under Tex. Crim. P. 39.14 [the Michael Morton Act, 
which provides for open-file discovery], I do knowingly waive (give up) my right to further 
discovery, except as provided by law.” See Dallas County Plea Agreements on file with 
author. Practitioners disagree on what the language of this waiver means, but the most 
common interpretation is that it waives the defendant’s right to further discovery except for 
the right to continue to receive exculpatory evidence, because the law specifically imposes a 
continuing obligation on the prosecution to disclose Brady evidence. 
 225 Interview with Defense Attorney #1, supra note 217. 
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offered as a take-it-or-leave it element of a plea bargain and are therefore 
not entirely voluntary.226  They can materially compromise the rights of a 
defendant in a criminal case.  As the next section discusses, this possibility 
highlights the limits and pitfalls of cooperation in discovery and in criminal 
cases more generally. 
C. THE LIMITS OF COOPERATION 
Even when the defense and prosecution are faced with overwhelming 
digital discovery, they may still abstain from cooperation in some cases.227  
For example, less experienced prosecutors and defense attorneys tend to be 
more adversarial and less open to collaborating with the other side.228  
Some defense attorneys may also cultivate a more combative image as a 
way of attracting clientele.229  In certain cases, defense attorneys may also 
find it in their client’s interest to use discovery motions as a delay tactic.230  
As one member of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules commented, 
“For every litigant operating in good faith . . . , there is another trying to 
figure out reasons to delay a trial or put 400 associates on a case to generate 
a gajillion gigabytes of data.”231 
Even where the parties do work collaboratively on digital discovery, 
such cooperation will not always produce a fair and just outcome.  For 
example, if the digital evidence at issue is too massive and complex, it may 
simply be impossible for the parties (especially the defense) to review it 
thoroughly in time for plea negotiations or trial.232  The inability to review 
 
 226 See Klein et al., supra note 191, at 83–85, 109. 
 227 CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 230 (noting that while some prosecutors 
cooperate with defense attorneys in producing e-discovery, others do not, even within the 
same district). 
 228 HEUMANN, supra note 180, at 53–57, 61–69; Battle, supra note 180; Wright & 
Levine, supra note 209, at 1066–67. 
 229 See, e.g., Battle, supra note 180, at 75. 
 230 Delay may be advantageous to a defendant for various reasons, including the fading 
of memories and unavailability of witnesses over time. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Courts 
in Slow Motion, Aided by the Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2013. 
 231 Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, April 28, 2017, at 8, in Advisory Committee 
on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 28, 2017, at 26. 
 232 E.g., United States v. Budovsky, No. 13 CR 00368 (DLC), 2016 WL 386133 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016). Defense attorneys who frequently handle ESI-heavy cases 
acknowledge that attorneys need to relinquish the notion that they can read every document 
in a case with voluminous digital evidence. Instead, attorneys must develop a strategy to 
focus on the evidence most relevant to their case: 
In the past, you wanted to touch every paper—it was a point of pride if you’d touched 
and reviewed every paper. With the amount of data today, you can’t touch every page 
any longer. The electronic storage curve is going up. I like to say, ‘Even if you only 
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the evidence undermines the fairness and accuracy of the ultimate 
disposition of the case.  Furthermore, if one party has vastly superior 
financial and investigative resources or disproportionate bargaining 
leverage in the case—and therefore little need to compromise—it can 
unduly influence the negotiations over digital discovery.  As a result, the 
other party may be left with insufficient ability to gather, process, or review 
the digital evidence.  It may also be pushed to agree to concessions—such 
as broad waivers of discovery, including of potentially exculpatory 
information—that risk compromising the fairness of the process. 
Cooperation between the parties therefore has its limits.  Defense 
counsel must consider at each step whether collaboration with the 
prosecution advances or compromises the client’s case.  And both defense 
and prosecution must remain vigilant that their cooperation does not lead to 
unfair and unjust outcomes.  Finally, a process that relies solely on 
bargaining between the parties—and therefore on the willingness and 
ability of individual prosecutors and defense attorneys to cooperate—is 
haphazard and may lead to arbitrary differences among similarly situated 
cases.233 
VI. REGULATING DIGITAL DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES 
Informal cooperation on digital discovery will not always occur in 
criminal cases, and even when it does, it may not produce efficient and fair 
resolution of discovery disputes.  More extensive regulation of the process 
is therefore necessary.  The civil procedure model, which has grappled with 
 
looked at each page for two seconds, the amount of pages there are, it will take you 
75 years . . . Lawyers have to understand they can’t see everything. That means that 
some relevant things are going to be excluded. Let’s say you exclude image files in a 
fraud case—well, if the client had a fax software, you might exclude some relevant 
faxes. So it’s important to talk to your client and know your case before you can make 
these decisions. You’re making broad cuts before ever looking at anything. It’s 
terrifying to a criminal defense attorney that you can miss something. 
Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82; see also Interview with Jason Hawkins, 
supra note 85 (“Some defense attorneys think you have to look at every page, touch 
everything. But you can’t do that with voluminous ESI. You have to have a theory of the 
defense case.”). 
 233 Cf. CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 230 (citing Michael Caruso, Federal Public 
Defender, S.D. Fla.) (“Here in this district . . . the process is quite haphazard. We may have a 
case where you just get a document dump . . . We have other cases where prosecutors will 
provide a skeletal index. We have other cases where the prosecutors will provide a full index 
and will sit down and talk with you and walk you through everything that’s in the 1,000 
PDFs . . . Unless there is a uniform standard, especially in the area of electronic discovery, I 
don’t know if there’s much we can do except bargain on . . . a case by case basis for a better 
outcome.”). 
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digital discovery for over two decades, can provide a helpful point of 
comparison for criminal procedure rule makers.  This Part reviews the 
promise and limits of the civil procedure model and lays out a framework to 
regulate digital discovery in criminal cases. 
A. LESSONS FROM CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Starting in the late 1990s, as digital evidence began proliferating, 
parties and courts in civil cases were confronted with the problems of 
voluminous and complex electronic discovery.  The problem arose in civil 
cases earlier than in criminal cases because civil discovery requirements are 
significantly broader and civil disputes frequently feature businesses that 
store and process vast amounts of data.  While these businesses can 
typically afford to pay for a large team of lawyers to process, review, and 
produce such evidence, the challenges remain daunting, as a 2007 article by 
experienced litigators explained: 
Take then, for example, litigation in which the universe subject to search stands 
at one billion e-mail records, at least 25% of which have one or more attachments of 
varying length (1 to 300 pages). Generously assume further that a model “reviewer” 
(junior lawyer, legal assistant, or contract professional) is able to review an average of 
fifty e-mails, including attachments, per hour. Without employing any automated 
computer process to generate potentially responsive documents, the review effort for 
this litigation would take 100 people, working ten hours a day, seven days a week, 
fifty-two weeks a year, over fifty-four years to complete. And the cost of such a 
review, at an assumed average billing of $100/hour, would be $2 billion. Even, 
however, if present-day search methods . . . are used to initially reduce the e-mail 
universe to 1% of its size . . . the case would still cost $20 million for a first pass 
review conducted by 100 people over 28 weeks, without accounting for any 
additional privilege review.234 
To address the problem of voluminous discovery, the Advisory 
Committee on the Civil Rules has amended the Rules of Civil Procedure 
several times, starting in 1983.235  In 2006, the Rules also expressly 
addressed the distinct challenges of electronic discovery.236  The rules 
promote cooperation between the parties to resolve e-discovery disputes 
and provide for judicial guidance in cases where cooperation fails to 
achieve fair and efficient discovery. 
 
 234 George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System 
Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, *20 (2007). 
 235 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the 1983 amendment. 
 236 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the 2006 amendment. 
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1. Promoting Cooperation Between the Parties 
The Rules and decisions interpreting the Rules are based on the idea 
that the digital information overload requires a “change in culture” among 
litigators when it comes to discovery: “truculence, gamesmanship, and a 
supreme rule of ‘volunteer nothing’” have to give way to cooperation.237  
To promote such cooperation, Rule 26(f) requires attorneys to meet and 
confer about discovery issues before the initial scheduling conference with 
the court.238  The Rule demands that the parties work together in good faith 
to develop a discovery plan to be submitted to the court within fourteen 
days of the conference.239  The discovery plan must state the parties’ views 
on “issues about disclosure, discovery or preservation of electronically 
stored information, including the form or forms in which it should be 
produced.”240  Court decisions have further held that the parties should 
discuss difficult and potentially contentious e-discovery issues, such as 
“whether each other’s software is compatible . . . and how to allocate costs 
[of e-discovery].”241  Elaborating on the Federal Rules, many court 
decisions and local rules have provided more specific guidelines, urging the 
parties to reach agreement on items such as production format, “search 
terms, date ranges, key players, and the like.”242 
Yet not all civil lawyers believe in the value of cooperation in e-
discovery.  In fact, the traditional view about discovery is that it is “a game, 
where players stall, obfuscate, and contest all discovery.”243  Accordingly, 
many civil litigators continue to abuse discovery to harass their opponents 
or delay the case.244  Surveys have found that civil litigators tend to be more 
 
 237 Paul & Baron, supra note 234, at *3. 
 238 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Securities Litigation, 205 F.R.D. 437, 444 (D.N.J. 2002). 
More generally, judges have cited with approval to the “Cooperation Proclamation” issued 
by the Sedona Conference (a working group of attorneys, judges, and other experts on 
complex litigation), which instructs attorneys to “strive in the best interests of their clients to 
achieve the best results at a reasonable cost, with integrity and candor as officers of the 
court.” SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 19, at 106. 
 242 Trusz v. UBS Realty Inv’rs LLC, 2010 WL 3583064, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 7, 2010). 
 243 Paul W. Grimm & Heather Leigh Williams, “The [Judicial] Beatings Will Continue 
until Morale Improves”: The Prisoner’s Dilemma of Cooperative Discovery and Proposals 
for Improved Morale, 43 U. BALT. L.F. 107, 116 (2013). 
 244 See, e.g., Paul W. Grimm, The State of Discovery Practice in Civil Cases: Must the 
Rules Be Changed to Reduce Costs and Burden, or Can Significant Improvements Be 
Achieved Within the Existing Rules?, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 47 (2011); Rebecca M. Hamburg 
& Matthew C. Koski, Summary of Results of Federal Judicial Center Survey of NELA 
Members, Fall 2009 (Nat’l Empl. Lawyers Assoc. Mar. 26, 2010), at 
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adversarial and less likely to cooperate with one another than lawyers in 
criminal cases, in large part because of the less frequent repeat player 
interaction between lawyers in civil disputes.245  Discovery cooperation 
may therefore fail when the attorneys have a poor relationship with each 
other, or when they find it strategically useful to act in an adversarial 
fashion.246  Non-cooperation is also more likely to occur when lawyers do 
not understand the technological issues involved in e-discovery.247 
2. Encouraging Judicial Management 
Recognizing the persistence of adversarial tactics in discovery, the 
Civil Rules also provide for active and early judicial management of 
discovery, as well as judicial intervention when cooperation fails.  At the 
Rule 16 pretrial conference early in the litigation, and again later during the 
discovery process, judges are expected to step in to manage schedules and 
resolve disputes.  The Advisory Committee notes to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure stress “the need for continuing and close judicial 
involvement in the cases that do not yield readily to the ideal of effective 
party management.”248  This management may be provided by a district 




[https://perma.cc/7A3Q-TVQJ] (finding that approximately two-thirds of respondents to 
NELA survey believe that discovery is abused in almost every case); ABA SECTION OF 
LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: DETAILED REPORT 106 (2009), at 
www.abanet.org/litigation/survey/docs/report-aba-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/29QS-696L] 
(finding that most defense and mixed practice lawyers tend to agree that e-discovery is being 
abused by counsel, while most plaintiffs’ lawyers do not). 
 245 Schneider, supra note 183, at 151, 156–57. 
 246 See, e.g., Mitchell London, Resolving the Civil Litigant’s Discovery Dilemma, 26 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 837, 838 (2013) (“The high costs [of e-discovery] have incentivized 
lawyers to engage in abusive or excessive discovery practices as a strategy to either increase 
settlement pressure or force their adversaries to abandon the dispute. Because abusive 
methods have proliferated, litigants assume that their adversary is strategically abusing the 
process—either by making unreasonable requests or by hiding information.”). 
 247 SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELEC. DISCOVERY COMM., SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC 
DISCOVERY PILOT PROGRAM REPORT ON PHASE ONE 20 (2010), available at 
https://www.discoverypilot.com/sites/default/files/phase1report.pdf [https://perma.cc/64JN-
MG6B]. 
 248 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the 2015 amendment. 
 249 Hon. Paul W. Grimm, Are We Insane? The Quest for Proportionality in the 
Discovery Rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 36 REV. LITIG. 117, 134–41 (2017) 
(reporting findings of survey of federal judges); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2009) (authorizing 
such delegation); FED. R. CIV. P. 72 (setting out procedures to be used by magistrates in 
managing pretrial matters such as discovery). 
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judges may also appoint special masters to help the parties coordinate 
discovery more effectively.250  The goal of judicial management is to reduce 
the costs of discovery and the length of the proceedings, while ensuring that 
the case is resolved in a fair and just manner. 251 
Judges rely on the principle of proportionality to limit discovery 
perceived as redundant or overly burdensome.  Proportionality was first 
introduced by the Rules in 1983 to manage large-volume discovery and has 
since been refined numerous times, both in the Rules and in case law.252  
The most recent amendment of Rule 26(b)(1) uses proportionality to limit 
the scope of discoverable evidence at the outset. Parties may obtain 
discovery of evidence only if it is nonprivileged, relevant to a claim or 
defense, and proportional to the needs of the case.253  In determining 
proportionality, the court must consider “the importance of the issues at 
stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to 
relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery 
in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”254  Judges are supposed to restrict 
discovery if the process is being abused or “overused” such that the 
discovery requested is out of proportion with the needs of the case.255 
With respect to ESI, the rules impose more specific limits.  If a party 
shows that the data sought are “not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost,” the court may issue a protective order that shields the 
responding party from production.256  But if the requesting party shows 
 
 250 FED. R. CIV. P. 53; Grimm, supra note 249, at 154–56. Because the parties must bear 
the costs of a special master appointment, a master will be appointed only if either the 
parties consent or an exceptional circumstance warrants the appointment or it is necessary to 
“address pretrial . . . matters that cannot be effectively and timely addressed by an available 
district judge or magistrate judge of the district.” FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1). 
 251 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (noting that the Rules of Civil Procedure should be interpreted in 
such a way as “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding”). 
 252 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to the 1983 and 2015 amendments; 
Grimm, supra note 249, at 123–34. 
 253 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 254 Id. 
 255 Under Rule 26(b)(2)(C), the court is expected to curtail discovery if it determines 
that: “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained 
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; the 
party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in 
the action;” or “the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). See Carr v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 312 F.R.D. 459, 468 
(N.D. Tex. 2015) (“[A] court can—and must—limit proposed discovery that it determines is 
not proportional to the needs of the case.”). 
 256 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
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good cause, the court may still order discovery even though the ESI is 
difficult or costly to produce.257  In deciding whether good cause exists, 
courts consider, among else, the relevance and usefulness of the ESI to the 
case, the availability of similar information from more easily accessed 
sources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the 
parties’ resources.258 
Courts have adopted a range of other measures to reduce the cost and 
complexity of voluminous digital discovery.259  Under a “phased discovery” 
approach, judges have limited the discovery allowed at the outset of the 
process and later reassessed the need for additional discovery based on the 
initial production.260  Courts have also encouraged the parties to limit the 
number of “custodians” or sources to be searched,261 or to stipulate to 
certain facts in an effort to focus the litigation on matters that are in 
dispute.262  Judges have also ordered the discovery of only a statistically 
significant sample of the other party’s records, particularly in cases 
involving massive databases.263 
Another technique commonly used to reduce the costs of discovery is 
to shift the costs of production from one party to the other.  The 
presumption in civil procedure is that the party responding to a discovery 
request must bear the financial burden of complying with the request.264  
But where such compliance would entail an “undue burden or expense,” the 
producing party may ask the court to shift the burden to the party seeking 
discovery.265  Such cost-shifting may incentivize the requesting party to 
 
 257 Id. “Active” data are typically considered accessible, but backup tapes and erased, 
fragmented, or damaged data are typically deemed inaccessible. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 258 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the 2006 amendment; see also Cassie 
M. v. Chafee, 2013 WL 11327084, at *5–*8 (D.R.I. Oct. 3, 2013); John B. v. Goetz, 879 F. 
Supp. 2d 787, 884–89 (M.D. Tenn. 2010); Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington 
v. WMATA, 242 F.R.D. 139, 147–48 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 259 Grimm, supra note 249, at 141–76. 
 260 See, e.g., id. at 159–60. 
 261 See, e.g., United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 272 F.R.D. 235, 241 
(D.D.C. 2011) (using proportionality analysis to limit the number of custodians whose data 
would be searched); Lights Out Holdings, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 2015 WL 4612116, at *3 (S.D. 
Cal. July 31, 2015) (ordering the parties to meet and confer to limit the number of 
custodians). 
 262 See, e.g., Donald E. Christophers, Case Management Conferences and Pretrial 
Hearings, and Pretrial Stipulations and Orders, BL FL-CLE 10-1 (2017). 
 263 Grimm, supra note 249, at 162–63. 
 264 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978). 
 265 Id. Cost-shifting may also be ordered as part of a proportionality approach, even 
when production is not shown to be unduly burdensome. 
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narrow its discovery requests and therefore lower the costs of e-
discovery.266 
To lessen the most significant costs of discovery—the costs of 
review—some courts have encouraged the use of technology such as 
predictive coding.267  Predictive coding uses artificial intelligence to find 
relevant documents more accurately than keyword searching.268  The 
process begins by human review of a sample set of documents.269  The 
computer then reviews the initial sample set of documents, identifies 
common features, and looks for similar documents in the remaining set.270  
At that point, an attorney reviews the results of the computerized search and 
adjusts the search criteria as needed.271  Testing and improving results at 
each step of the process, predictive coding can produce an accuracy level 
similar to that of manual review of voluminous evidence, but at a lesser cost 
and faster speed.272 
Another way in which courts have tried to reduce the costs of e-
discovery is to shorten the timeline within which discovery occurs.  Where 
the parties have failed to agree on deadlines, judges have set timetables 
themselves.  They have also imposed sanctions when the parties have failed 
to comply with their discovery obligations.273 
While judges frequently focus on restricting the scope of discovery to 
manageable proportions, at times, they temper efforts to narrow the scope 
of discovery in order to ensure that the process is fair.  For example, the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has clarified that, in conducting 
proportionality analyses, courts should consider “the parties’ relative access 
to relevant information.”274  This factor was included to address cases with 
“information asymmetry,” where “one party—often the individual 
 
 266 E.g., Hon. James C. Francis IV, Cost Shifting in E-Discovery, in MANAGING E-
DISCOVERY AND ESI: FROM PRE-LITIGATION THROUGH TRIAL 591, 613–14 (Michael D. 
Berman et al. eds. 2011). 
 267 Grimm, supra note 249, at 167–69. 
 268 Edward J. Imwinkelried & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Tactics for Attorney Seeking 
Production, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY STRATEGY & TACTICS § 9:13 (2017). 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. But cf. David J. Waxse & Brenda Yoakum-Kriz, Experts on Computer-Assisted 
Review: Why Federal Rule of Evidence 702 Should Apply to Their Use, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 
207 (2013) (noting that the use of experts to offer opinions on predictive coding may 
decrease the efficiency of the technology). 
 273 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37; Patroski v. Ridge, 2011 WL 5593738, at *4 (W.D. Pa. 
Nov. 17, 2011). 
 274 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the 2015 amendment. 
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plaintiff—may have very little discoverable information. . . [while] [t]he 
other party may have vast amounts of information, including information 
that can be readily retrieved. . . .”275  When this occurs, “the burden of 
responding to discovery lies heavier on the party who has more 
information. . .”276 
In the interests of fairness, when deciding whether to restrict e-
discovery or shift its costs, courts may also consider factors such as each 
party’s ability to control costs, the importance of the issues at stake, and the 
parties’ resources.277  If a case involves an important public matter—such as 
a constitutional, civil rights, or criminal law question—courts are more 
likely to order discovery, even if producing such discovery is unduly 
burdensome.278  Likewise, if the party requesting discovery has 
significantly fewer resources than the party producing discovery, the court 
is less likely to shift costs for the production.279  As the next section 
discusses, courts have also used the format and organization requirements 
of Rule 34 to prevent a better-resourced party from overwhelming the other 
side with voluminous and disorganized production of ESI.  In all these 
ways, courts help ensure that e-discovery proceeds not simply efficiently, 
but also fairly. 
3. Drafting Detailed Rules 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set out clearly what the parties’ 
presumptive obligations are with respect to the formatting and organization 
of ESI production.  Rule 34(b)(1)(C) provides that the party requesting ESI 
“may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information 
is to be produced.”280  If the responding party objects to the requested form 
of ESI, it must state the form it would use instead.281  If the parties cannot 
 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. 
 277 John B. v. Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d 787, 887 (M.D. Tenn. 2010); Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) 
advisory committee’s note to the 2006 amendment (listing factors to be considered in 
restricting discovery and shifting costs). In determining the parties’ resources, some courts 
focus solely on the parties’ finances, while others also consider counsel’s resources. Francis 
IV, supra note 266, at 610–11. 
 278 See, e.g., Simon v. Nw. Univ., 2017 WL 467677, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2017); 
Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 887. 
 279 See, e.g., Hawa v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., 2017 WL 1021026, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 16, 2017) (refusing to shift costs from school district to individual plaintiffs, given the 
disparity of resources between the parties). 
 280 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C). 
 281 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D). 
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come to an agreement about the form and format of electronic discovery, 
the court will decide.  The court will be guided by the default 
requirements282 laid out in Rule 34(b)(2)(E): 
(i) A party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business or 
must organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the request;283 
(ii) If a request does not specify a form for producing electronically stored 
information, a party must produce it in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily 
maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms; and 
(iii) A party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than 
one form.284 
These requirements prevent discovery “dumps” of “an unidentified 
mass” of documents, as well as the deliberate mixing of relevant and 
irrelevant ESI to make it difficult for the receiving party to review.285  
Similar provisions in state rules of civil procedure guide the production, 
formatting, and labeling of ESI to ensure fair and efficient discovery.286 
Judges have relied on these requirements and on their own inherent 
authority to manage discovery to order parties to organize and label 
documents and ESI produced in discovery.287  To facilitate review by the 
 
 282 The Rule states that these requirements apply “unless otherwise stipulated or ordered 
by the court.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E). 
 283 As a Michigan federal court explained: 
Rule 34(b)(i) is meant to prevent a party from obscuring the significance of 
documents by giving some structure to the production. The party arguing that it 
produced documents as they were kept in the usual course of business bears the 
burden of showing that the documents were so kept. A party does so by revealing 
such information as where the documents were maintained, who maintained them, 
and whether the documents came from one single source or file or from multiple 
sources or files. 
Nolan, LLC. v. TDC Int’l Corp., 2007 WL 3408584, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 15, 2007) 
(citations omitted). If the producing party fails to explain how the documents were kept in 
the ordinary course of business, then it must organize the production to correspond to the 
request for production. See, e.g., Enargy Power (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd. v. Xiaolong Wang, 
2014 WL 4687542, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 2014). 
 284 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E). Although 34(b)(2)(E)(i) refers to “documents” while (ii) 
expressly refers to ESI, most courts have held that both (i) and (ii) apply to ESI because the 
drafters intended to reduce the hurdles of ESI review faced by the receiving party. Steven S. 
Gensler, Rule 34, 1 FED. R. CIV. PROC., RULES AND COMMENTARY (2018). 
 285 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes to 1980 and 2006 
amendments; United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 19–20 (D.D.C. 2008); see also 
Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., LLC, 323 F.R.D. 360, 386–89 (D.N.M. 2018). 
 286 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3122(c); N.J. CT. R. 4:18-1; FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.350. 
 287 See, e.g., Enargy Power, 2014 WL 4687542, at *4 (holding that where the producing 
party did not show that the documents were produced as they were kept in the usual course 
of business, they must organize and label the documents to correspond to the categories in 
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requesting party, they have also required the parties to produce ESI in a 
format that is “reasonably usable,” even if this requires converting the files 
in a different format.288  When the ESI is particularly complex—for 
example, when producing database information—courts have even ordered 
the producing party “to provide some reasonable amount of technical 
support, information on application software, or other reasonable assistance 
to enable the requesting party to use the information.”289 
In brief, the law regulates digital discovery more closely in civil than 
in criminal cases.  Some of the rules and managerial techniques of civil 
procedure could also be applied in criminal cases, and indeed, a few judges 
have done precisely that.290  But as the next section elaborates, a number of 
important differences between civil and criminal cases limit the analogical 
value of the civil model for digital discovery.  These differences explain 
why wholesale adoption of the civil procedure rules for digital discovery 
would not work and why more tailored regulation for criminal case e-
discovery is needed. 
B. THE LIMITS OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE MODEL 
A number of differences between the civil and criminal procedure 
frameworks caution against wholesale adoption of the civil model.  These 
include different pleading standards, varying background discovery rules, 
and disparity in the resources available to the parties.  More broadly, 
criminal procedure rules incorporate important constitutional rights, which 
 
request for production); Hanwha Azdel, Inc. v. C & D Zodiac, Inc., 2012 WL 6726412, at *2 
(W.D. Va. Dec. 27, 2012) (holding that defendant “violated Rule 34 by not producing its ESI 
in a format which is usable or providing an index and ordering the documents responsive to 
the specific requests for production”); EEOC v. DHL Exp., 2011 WL 6825516, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Dec. 28, 2011) (ordering the defendant to supplement discovery with a “particularized 
list of the discovery request(s) to which each spreadsheet, or groups of spreadsheets, if 
appropriate, is responsive”); City of Colton v. Am. Promotional Events Inc., 277 F.R.D. 578 
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (ordering the production of ESI in native format or the labeling of ESI 
production to correspond to requests for production); see also Suarez Corp. Industries v. 
Earthwise Technologies, Inc., 2008 WL 2811162, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 17, 2008) 
(ordering the defendant to “convey some information as to how documents [produced] were 
determined to be responsive or how the documents were kept in the normal course of 
business”).  
 288 See, e.g., In re Verisign, Inc., Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 2445243, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
10, 2004). 
 289 Pero v. Norfolk Southern Ry., Co., 2014 WL 6772619, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 1, 
2014) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to the 2006 amendment); see also 
Frye v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2016 WL 2758268, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 12, 2016); Gensler, 
supra note 284, at 15. 
 290 See, e.g., United States v. Briggs, 831 F. Supp. 2d 623, 628 (W.D.N.Y. 2011); United 
States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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restrain the ability of the state to gather information directly from 
defendants.291  Other critical constitutional rights that shape criminal 
procedure include the rights to due process (which is more robust in the 
criminal than the civil context), to speedy trial, and to effective counsel.292  
These may warrant more active judicial intervention in certain discovery 
disputes—for example, to ensure that a criminal defendant has a reasonable 
opportunity to prepare for trial.  Finally, the public interest in ensuring fair, 
accurate, and transparent criminal prosecutions also has implications for 
criminal case discovery rules, weighing against certain restrictions and 
waivers of discovery that are more easily accepted in civil cases.  While 
many other differences between the civil and criminal procedure 
frameworks exist, the brief overview in this section focuses on those 
differences that are especially pertinent to digital discovery rules and 
practices. 
As a preliminary matter, the background pleading and discovery rules 
differ significantly in civil and criminal cases.293  Parties in a civil case can 
discover a broader range of information than their counterparts in a criminal 
case.  In a civil case, discovery is available on any matter that is not 
privileged, is relevant to claims and defenses, and is proportional to the 
case.294  The broad availability of discovery in civil cases raises the cost and 
complexity of digital evidence that the parties must handle.  By contrast, 
criminal procedure rules limit in various ways the type of evidence that 
must be produced by either party, reducing the volume of digital 
discovery.295 
At the same time, civil procedure rules better equip the parties to cope 
with voluminous digital discovery.  Pleading requirements are more 
demanding in civil cases and thus help the parties better understand the 
issues in dispute.  The complaint must include “a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief . . . .”296  To 
sustain a motion to dismiss, the complaint must include “enough facts to 
 
 291 U.S. Const. amend. V, VI, XIV. 
 292 U.S. Const. amend. V, VI, XIV. 
 293 For a fascinating analysis of the different trajectories of the federal civil and criminal 
procedure rules, see Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal Procedure Are So Different: A 
Forgotten History, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 697 (2017). 
 294 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 295 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 825–26 (1996) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(1)). The main reason for these limitations is the concern about protecting victims, 
witnesses, and informants. See, e.g., Meyn, supra note 21, at 1127–28. 
 296 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 
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state a claim that is plausible on its face.”297  In other words, “[f]actual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level.”298  While the exact level of detail required is ultimately left to the 
trial judge’s discretion, the Supreme Court has specified that “‘labels and 
conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 
will not do.’”299  As a result of this jurisprudence, civil defendants have 
better notice than criminal defendants about the key facts supporting the 
allegations against them, and the pleadings can help civil parties direct their 
digital discovery efforts.300 
By contrast, defendants in criminal cases typically receive only a 
skeletal description of the relevant facts in the indictment or information.301  
Rules of criminal procedure require merely that the charging instrument 
contain a “plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential 
facts constituting the offense charged . . . .”302  Prosecutors need not state 
the facts in specific detail.  An indictment will survive a motion to dismiss 
as long as it informs the defendant of the statute he is charged with 
violating, lists the elements of the offense charged, and specifies the time 
and place of the alleged offense.303  In theory, a defendant may file a motion 
 
 297 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 298 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 299 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
 300 Roughly half of the states have rules that replicate the federal rules on this point, 
while the rest have procedures that differ significantly. Roger Michalski & Abby K. Wood, 
Twombly and Iqbal at the State Level, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 424, 430 (2017). In the 
wake of Twombly and Iqbal, twenty-four states have moved towards “tighter pleading” 
while twenty-six states have maintained “notice pleading.” A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading 
in State Courts After Twombly and Iqbal, POUND CIV. JUST. INST. 2 (2010), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038349 [https://perma.cc/Y42K-
5P7T]. 
 301 Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, Sept. 19, 2016, at 9, in Advisory Committee 
on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 28, 2017, at 27. 
 302 FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1). See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.140(b) (providing that an 
indictment or information shall be a “plain, concise, and definite written statement of the 
essential facts constituting the offense charged”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/111-3 
(stating that the charge must include the name of the offense, the statutory provision, the 
nature and elements of the offense, the date and county of the offense, and the name of the 
accused); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 21.02 (providing that an indictment must contain the name 
of the accused, the place where the offense was committed, and the offense set forth in 
“plain and intelligible words.”). 
 303 United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 772 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Ulbricht, 
31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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for a bill of particulars if the indictment is not sufficiently specific.304  But 
such motions are rarely granted, particularly if the defendant is entitled to 
discovery.305  In fact, motions for bills of particulars are often seen by 
prosecutors and courts as aggressive tactics by the defense and might invite 
retaliation.306 
In addition to requiring greater specificity in pleadings, civil rules 
provide for active discovery tools such as depositions and interrogatories.  
These tools again help the parties better understand the heart of the case and 
review ESI accordingly.307  They can help not only with understanding the 
substance of the evidence produced, but also with the organization of the 
discovery.  For example, in civil cases with voluminous digital discovery, 
the parties receiving the ESI have used interrogatories and depositions to 
determine the procedures that the producing party used to collect, search, 
and produce the information.308 
But in criminal cases, neither depositions nor interrogatories are 
generally available.309  The prosecution has a powerful substitute for a 
deposition: subpoenaing witnesses to testify before a grand jury.  But the 
defense has no such powers and has to rely on the voluntary cooperation of 
potential witnesses, which is rarely forthcoming.  As a result, the defense is 
at a significant disadvantage in obtaining relevant testimonial evidence—in 
comparison to both the prosecution and civil litigants.310  This undercuts its 
ability to understand the crux of the case and focus its discovery efforts 
accordingly. 
 
 304 FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f). 
 305 See, e.g., Urban, 404 F.3d at 772; United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1180 (9th 
Cir. 1979); Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful 
Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1148 (2005) (same); Hon. H. Lee Sarokin, 
Presumed Innocent? Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie This 
Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1991) (noting that motions for bills of 
particulars are rarely granted). 
 306 HEUMANN, supra note 180, at 52–91 (finding that prosecutors and courts view 
motions for bills of particulars as aggressive tactics and that such motions are usually filed 
by inexperienced defense attorneys). 
 307 See, e.g., Edward L. Miner & Adrian P. Schoone, The Effective Use of Written 
Interrogatories, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 29, 29 (1976); see also Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules 
Meeting, Sept. 19, 2016, at 9, in Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Meeting, 
Washington, D.C., Apr. 28, 2017, at 27. 
 308 See, e.g., Jeffrey Gross, Objection to Form: Rule 34(B) and the Form of Production 
of Electronically Stored Information, 20 PRAC. LITIGATOR 39, 43 (2009). 
 309 See, e.g., Meyn, supra note 21, at 1110, 1114 (surveying the availability of 
depositions and interrogatories in criminal cases in different jurisdictions). 
 310 See, e.g., id. at 1091–97. 
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In one respect, the prosecution is also more limited in its ability to 
obtain testimonial evidence than a civil party might be.  The privilege 
against self-incrimination limits the ability of the prosecution to obtain 
statements directly from the defendant.311  But exceptions to the privilege 
against self-incrimination and the willingness of most defendants to waive 
their right to remain silent mean that, in practice, the prosecution is 
frequently able to obtain at least some critical information from the 
defendant as well.312  And as discussed earlier, the privilege against self-
incrimination has been interpreted to permit provisions demanding a broad 
range of documentary evidence from the defense, including documents and 
tangible objects the defense intends to use in its case, summaries of 
anticipated expert testimony, and witness names and statements.313 
The legal framework for obtaining documentary evidence from third 
parties is likewise more favorable to civil litigants than to criminal 
defendants.  In civil cases, subpoenas for documents have to merely meet a 
forgiving relevance standard.314  Relevance in this context has been 
interpreted “broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that 
reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on any issue that is or 
may be in the case.”315  Subpoenas requesting relevant evidence will be 
quashed or modified only if they require disclosure of privileged 
information, impose an undue burden or cost on the person or entity that is 
subject to the subpoena, or fail to meet geographical or timing 
requirements.316 
By contrast, in criminal cases, the Nixon standard requires that 
subpoenas to non-parties meet the more stringent requirements of 
relevancy, admissibility, and specificity.317  Parties in criminal cases are 
therefore more constrained than their civil counterparts in obtaining 
documentary evidence from non-parties.  The limits on subpoena powers 
 
 311 Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance, 
74 CALIF. L. REV. 1567, 1572 (1986) (noting constitutional limitations on discovery against 
the defense). 
 312 William W. Berry III, Magnifying Miranda, 50 TEX. TECH L. REV. 97, 103 (2017). 
 313 See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 314 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) & 45; Warnke v. CVS Corp., 265 F.R.D. 64, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 
2010). The Civil Rules also require that the subpoena not be unduly burdensome. FED. R. 
CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv). 
 315 AP Links, LLC v. Russ, 299 F.R.D. 7, 11 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Oppenheimer 
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)); see also Zabin v. Picciotto, 896 N.E.2d 
937, 956 (Mass. 2008). Furthermore, “information within [the] scope of discovery need not 
be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 316 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3). 
 317 See supra notes 127–131 and accompanying text. 
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affect criminal defendants disproportionately.  While the prosecution can 
use searches and seizures to obtain documents and other tangible evidence 
from anyone who has evidence relevant to the case, the defense’s only 
option for gathering tangible evidence from non-cooperative third parties is 
to rely on subpoenas.  As a result, if the prosecution has failed to obtain 
data, metadata, or algorithms relevant to the defense case, the defense 
remains at a significant disadvantage in developing its case—an obstacle 
that civil parties do not face under civil subpoena and discovery rules. 
Another reason why the civil procedure approach to e-discovery 
cannot be directly transplanted is the lack of resources in criminal cases 
generally, but especially on the defense side.  In complex civil litigation, 
where e-discovery is likely to be the most challenging, the parties can 
typically afford to pay for sophisticated software and technology experts, as 
well as experienced lawyers and legal assistants to help with the process.  
By contrast, in criminal cases, both prosecutors and defense attorneys have 
limited funding for technological support and legal staff to process and 
review digital discovery.318 
Financial and staffing constraints are particularly acute for the defense. 
Resource disparities between the parties are a distinguishing feature of 
criminal cases in the United States.319  Over 80% of felony defendants have 
appointed counsel, and appointed counsel—as well as many of retained 
counsel who are solo practitioners—have fewer investigative resources and 
staff than do prosecutors.320  Most pertinent to digital discovery, they can 
rarely afford the software and personnel to process voluminous digital 
 
 318 See Brown, supra note 53, at 168 (describing difficulties experienced by local 
prosecutor offices in Texas that lack the capacity to manage electronic evidence); Doucette, 
supra note 4, at 431 (noting that few Virginia local prosecutor’s offices have the capacity for 
e-discovery and that the introduction of such systems is “cost prohibitive” for many); see 
also Claud, supra note 80, at 145. 
 319 See, e.g., Broderick, supra note 73. See generally Abraham Goldstein, The State and 
the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L. J. 1149, 1149–50 
(1960) (discussing the balance of legal advantages in favor of the prosecution); David 
Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1731–49 (1993) (noting 
the resource differential between defense and prosecution). 
 320 Laurence A. Benner, The Presumption of Guilt: Systemic Factors That Contribute to 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in California, 45 CALIF. W. L. REV. 263, 268 (2009) (“For 
every dollar spent statewide on prosecution [in California], only fifty-three cents is spent on 
average for the defense of the indigent accused.”); Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense 
of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1103 (2014) (quoting DEBORAH L. 
RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 123 (2004)) (acknowledging that indigent defense receives “only 
an eighth of the resources per case available to prosecutors”). On the crisis of indigent 
defense in the United States, see STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEF., supra 
note 218, at v, 7–14. 
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evidence.321  To purchase the necessary software and hire an information 
technology expert, appointed counsel has to get permission from the court. 
Judges have discretion on what funding to authorize and on what 
schedule.322  Defense attorneys may therefore not have sufficient funding to 
review ESI adequately within the pretrial time constraints.323 
Furthermore, while clients in civil cases are broadly available to 
review the discovery and help the attorney make sense of it, criminal 
defendants are often detained before trial and unable to assist counsel in 
preparing for trial.324  Detention exacerbates the asymmetry of resources in 
criminal cases and presents challenges that do not arise in civil cases. 
Criminal cases also entail constitutional protections that civil cases do 
not. The earlier discussion referenced the limits that the privilege against 
self-incrimination sets on the ability of prosecutors to obtain testimonial 
 
 321 See, e.g., Broderick & Aoki, supra note 14, at 7; CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 
228 (“Panel attorneys have an especially difficult time handling ESI. Many are solo 
practitioners with little or no staff, and they do not have the training, experience, or 
assistance needed to access and review ESI.”). 
 322 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (2012); United States v. Salyer, 2011 WL 
1466887, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2011); Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, Sept. 19, 
2016, at 9, in Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 28, 
2017, at 27 (“In 85-90% of cases defenders in federal cases represent poor people, and in 
those cases they must go to the judge if they want an expert. That complicates the situation 
enormously because the judges rightfully have discretion as to how much to spend, who you 
can hire, at what point you can hire them.”); 7 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 310.70.30-40, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/judiciary-policies/cja-guidelines/chapter-3-ss-320-
authorization-investigative-expert#a320_70_30 [https://perma.cc/XZ9U-MCEK]. 
 323 Cf. United States v. Budovsky, No. 13 CR 00368 (DLC), 2016 WL 386133, at *12 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016) (“Given the fact that the discovery contains so many pages and 
lines of data, no attorney or team of attorneys could meaningfully review all of it even with 
years to prepare for trial.”); United States v. Faulkner, 2011 WL 3962513 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 
8, 2011) (rejecting defense motion of continuance and noting that funding for computer 
forensic expert in case involving 38 GB of ESI was approved eight months before trial date, 
that full, searchable access to the processed data was approved five months before trial, and 
that “decent access” to the ESI was provided to detained defendant 2 months before trial); cf. 
STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEF., supra note 218, at 19 (noting that as a 
result of poor funding and excessive caseloads, “in many cases, indigent defense attorneys 
fail to fully conduct investigations [and] prepare their cases ”). 
 324 In federal court, between 2008 and 2010, only 36% of defendantswere released 
before the adjudication of their case. THOMAS H. COHEN, PRETRIAL RELEASE AND 
MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 2008–2010 (BJS 2012), at 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ pdf/prmfdc0810.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG3F-G8RE]. In 
state court, 62% of felony defendants were released prior to disposition of their case. 
THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN 
STATE COURTS (BJS 2007), at https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8DUW-GKUG]. 
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evidence directly from the defendant.325  In addition, the stronger due 
process protections in criminal cases, where the defendant’s liberty is at 
stake, will at times mandate judicial intervention to ensure that discovery 
proceeds fairly and that the defendant receives effective counsel, even if he 
cannot afford one on his own.  As discussion in the next section elaborates, 
given the more significant due process protections in criminal cases, the 
court may need to help defendants obtain digital evidence material to their 
case from private parties; facilitate review of digital evidence by defendants 
who are detained; and demand some prosecutorial organization of 
voluminous digital evidence produced to the defense, to ensure that 
exculpatory evidence is not overlooked.326 
Besides stronger due process protections, criminal cases entail 
important public values that are less likely to be at stake in private disputes.  
Because of the public concerns involved, it is rarely appropriate to restrict 
discovery on efficiency grounds under a proportionality analysis.327  Facts 
necessary to the accurate resolution of a criminal or constitutional matter 
are important not solely to the parties, but also to the public, and therefore 
cannot remain concealed.328  By contrast, in purely private disputes, courts 
 
 325 See supra notes 311–313 and accompanying text. 
 326 See infra Part VI.C.2. 
 327 In civil cases, courts consider the importance of the issues at stake as one factor in 
the proportionality analysis. Accordingly, while discovery is less likely to be limited in those 
cases, the importance of the issues at stake is just one of several relevant factors, not a 
dispositive one, and courts in civil cases concerning public matters (such as civil rights 
claims) have occasionally restricted discovery when other factors have weighed in favor of a 
restriction. See supra notes 252–255, 277 and accompanying text. 
 328 In analyzing whether to restrict discovery under the proportionality principle, a recent 
court decision emphasized the important public issues at stake in criminal cases and related 
civil actions: 
The Court finds the importance of the issues at stake in this action extremely high. 
The complaint on its face involves, among other things, two innocent civilians who 
were murdered, two people who lost their liberty for extended periods of time both of 
whom later had their convictions vacated, and a high profile journalism professor 
accused of employing unethical investigatory tactics at the behest of one of the 
nation’s most prestigious universities. The loss of liberty alone, as alleged, is 
extremely significant . . . But the importance of this case transcends the parties 
involved: at its core, it questions the legitimacy of the criminal justice system as 
applied by the Cook County State’s Attorney’s office and the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system as questioned by Northwestern and Professor Protess, all 
conducted squarely in the public eye. For these reasons, the Court finds this case to be 
of utmost importance. 
Simon v. Nw. Univ., 2017 WL 467677, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2017); see also John B. v. 
Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d 787, 887 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (noting that the importance of the issues 
at stake, enforcing congressional mandate to provide medically necessary care to children, is 
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are more open to constraining disproportionate discovery requests and 
better justified in doing so. 
For all these reasons, legal as well as practical, the experiences with e-
discovery in civil cases cannot be directly transplanted to the criminal 
context.  Instead, a more cautious comparative analysis is required. 
C. REGULATION OF DIGITAL DISCOVERY TAILORED FOR CRIMINAL 
CASES 
While we must remain mindful of the differences between the civil 
and criminal procedure frameworks, important similarities remain that can 
help guide regulation of digital discovery in criminal cases.  As David 
Sklansky and Stephen Yeazell have argued, “civil and criminal 
procedure . . . are both . . . systems of adjudicating—or otherwise 
resolving—disputes, and settling—or sidestepping—disagreements about 
historical facts.  They both aim at fairness, accuracy, and efficiency—albeit 
in different mixtures.”329  Of particular relevance to digital discovery, civil 
litigants, courts, and rule makers have had to cope with the rising costs of e-
discovery for more than two decades now and have developed some 
workable measures to limit these costs.  These include encouraging 
cooperation between the parties, promoting active judicial management 
where cooperation fails, and drafting detailed rules to govern e-discovery.  
Civil procedure has also had to confront informational asymmetries 
between the parties, an experience that can offer some guidance on 
addressing one of the key problems in criminal digital discovery—the 
disparity of resources and investigative power in criminal cases.  Judges 
and policymakers can therefore borrow from the civil procedure model for 
regulating digital discovery and transplant features of it in the criminal 
procedure setting, but in a way that is mindful of the differences in 
background rules, resource constraints, due process protections, and public 
interests at stake. 
1. Promoting Cooperation Between the Parties 
The first broadly accepted insight from the two decades of experience 
with e-discovery in civil cases is that cooperation between the parties is 
critical to reducing the cost of the process.330  While such cooperation is in 
 
critical factor weighing in favor of ordering production of ESI, even if production is unduly 
burdensome). 
 329 Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 21, at 684. 
 330 See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: 
DETAILED REPORT 3 (2009), at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/survey/ docs/ report-aba-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U7F-ZDFD] (reporting that 95% of the litigators surveyed 
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tension with the adversarial model, it is not entirely incompatible with it.  
As Judge Paul Grimm has observed, “[h]owever central the adversary 
system is to our way of formal dispute resolution, there is nothing inherent 
in it that precludes cooperation between the parties and their attorneys 
during the litigation process to achieve orderly and cost effective discovery 
of the competing facts on which the system depends.”331 
In criminal cases, too, early experiences with e-discovery confirm the 
insight that cooperation can help resolve some of the recurring disputes 
about voluminous digital evidence.  As Part V discussed, early experience 
with digital discovery tends to confirm the benefits of cooperation, and 
studies of criminal law practice more broadly have documented a 
longstanding practice of reciprocal accommodation between the parties in 
criminal cases.332  Along the same lines, early consultations between the 
parties on digital discovery mechanics and openness to cooperation can go 
a long way toward solving some frequent problems, such as distributing 
fairly the burdens of formatting and reviewing digital files, finding 
adequate methods for safeguarding sensitive information, and ensuring 
discovery access by detained defendants. 
Drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are therefore 
correct to emphasize the importance of collaborative practice and require 
the parties to meet and confer about digital discovery early in a criminal 
proceeding, as the proposed Rule 16.1 does.333 In the notes accompanying 
the proposed rule, the drafters also encourage the parties to refer to the ESI 
Protocol, which can further usefully guide cooperation.334  Cooperation 
about digital discovery mechanics, such as the format of discovery, the 
location of key documents, and security and redaction measures to be taken, 
can reduce the time, effort, and expenses needed to review digital evidence.  
To promote such cooperation, rule drafters could presumptively place the 
 
believe that collaboration and professionalism by attorneys can reduce client costs); see also 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELEC. DISCOVERY COMM., SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 
PILOT PROGRAM REPORT ON PHASE ONE 39, at https:// www.discoverypilot.com/sites/ 
default/files/phase1report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZX2-EV5E] (survey finding that Principles 
encouraging cooperation in discovery appear to be generally effective at improving 
discovery practices and promoting the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of cases). 
 331 Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 361 (D. Md. 2008). 
 332 See supra Parts V.A–B. 
 333 Draft Rule 16.1, supra note 22. 
 334 Id. Courts should likewise encourage the parties to confer with one another and to 
work out solutions to e-discovery problems. In the Western District of Oklahoma, local rules 
require such a conference; within a week after the conference, the parties have to file a Joint 
Statement of Discovery Conference, in which, among other things, they state contested 
issues of discovery. W.D. OKLA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(b) App. V. 
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burden of reformatting or cataloging digital evidence on the party with 
greater resources in most criminal cases—the prosecution.  Such a 
presumption would encourage the prosecution to cooperate with the defense 
in finding ways to reduce its own production burden.  The prosecution may 
argue in individual cases that it does not have greater resources than the 
defense to process digital evidence and that the presumption should 
therefore not apply. 
Organizational innovations could also help spur cooperation in digital 
discovery.  Prosecutors’ offices, public defenders’ offices, and courts can 
all create units of specialized attorneys and tech experts who can handle 
ESI.  The ESI experts within the public defenders offices could be made 
available to private defense attorneys as well, at cost.  A model for a similar 
arrangement comes from the Dallas Federal Public Defender’s Office, 
which has already made ESI storage and maintenance services available to 
private defense attorneys appointed by the court in some cases.335  Lawyers 
who are proficient in ESI can serve as “points of contact” at public 
defenders offices and U.S. attorneys offices and help negotiate digital 
discovery disputes that arise in cases handled by these offices.  A similar 
framework was proposed by the Joint Electronic Technology Working 
Group to encourage collaboration in making e-discovery available to 
detained defendants.336  If implemented more broadly to handle all ESI-
related problems that arise in criminal cases, it can improve the fairness and 
efficiency of digital discovery.337 
But while efforts to promote cooperation are important starting points, 
they are not sufficient.  Negotiations will falter in certain cases, either 
because the cost and complexity of digital discovery are too high or because 
one or both of the parties do not have a sufficient incentive to cooperate.  In 
yet other cases, the disparity of resources between the parties may be so 
high that cooperation could produce inequitable results.  For all those 
reasons, courts and legislators must establish baseline rules for digital 
discovery in criminal cases.  As civil practice suggests, active judicial 
management and detailed digital discovery rules are critical backstops when 
cooperation falls apart. 
 
 335 See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 336 McEnany & Elm, supra note 145, at 49. 
 337 Surveys of civil litigators have found that lack of technical understanding is a key 
reason for the failure of cooperation in e-discovery. See supra note 247 and accompanying 
text. The creation of specialized units in the criminal justice system would therefore be 
critical to the success of e-discovery cooperation in criminal cases. 
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2. Encouraging Judicial Management 
A key insight that applies in both the civil and criminal contexts is that 
judges can promote a more efficient and fairer discovery process by 
actively managing the process from an early stage.  To increase the speed 
and lower the cost of digital discovery, judges can require the parties to 
develop a discovery plan shortly after the meet and confer session, impose 
deadlines for discovery, order a “phased discovery,” and, where necessary, 
resolve disputes about abusive discovery.338  In civil cases, such 
management techniques have been effective in reducing the costs of 
discovery.339 
While many of these techniques can streamline the process without 
impairing the defendant’s rights or the public’s interest in transparency and 
truth-seeking, others—such as monetary caps—are likely to be problematic 
if applied to the criminal context.  Criminal cases aim to vindicate an 
important public interest in accurate factfinding about alleged breaches of 
fundamental community norms.  Because criminal cases may result in 
deprivation of liberty by the state, they also implicate fundamental 
constitutional rights of the accused.  Courts must therefore be careful not to 
curb discovery in a way that may jeopardize the public’s interest in accurate 
factfinding or the defendant’s due process rights, including the right to 
receive exculpatory evidence from the prosecution.  Just as judges have 
been more reluctant to limit discovery in civil cases concerning 
constitutional and civil rights matters, so it would be less appropriate to 
restrict discovery in criminal cases.340 
Judges must also intervene to ensure that serious disparity of resources 
does not undermine the fairness of digital discovery.  Such intervention is 
particularly important in criminal cases in order to safeguard the 
defendant’s rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel.  These 
rights have been interpreted to mean that the defendant must be given a 
reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial341 and to compel witnesses on his 
behalf.342  In cases with voluminous digital evidence, to provide a 
 
 338 For a similar proposal calling for more active judicial management of discovery in 
criminal cases generally, see McConkie, supra note 51, at 122–25. 
 339 See supra note 330 and accompanying text. 
 340 See, e.g., Simon v. Nw. Univ., 2017 WL 467677, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2017). 
 341 See, e.g., People v. Maddox, 433 P.2d 163, 166 (Cal. 1967) (“That counsel for a 
defendant has a right to reasonable opportunity to prepare for a trial is as fundamental as is 
the right to counsel.”). 
 342 Indeed, the Compulsory Process Clause expressly provides the defendant with the 
right to have the state’s assistance in compelling evidence for trial on the defendant’s behalf. 
But because courts have interpreted the Clause to provide no more than what the Due 
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reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial, judges may need to mediate 
discussions between defense, prosecution, and detention facilities to ensure 
access to discovery for detained defendants.343  To ensure that the defense is 
able to obtain material evidence held by third parties, judges can reduce the 
restrictions on defense subpoena powers, as a number of courts have 
already done.344  Likewise, in cases where the defense needs the consent of 
a third party in order for a service provider to release electronic 
communications material to the defense, the court can order the third party 
to either produce the communications directly or provide the needed 
consent so the service provider can produce them.345  If the social media or 
email account owner who could provide the relevant consent is dead or 
unreachable, the court could order the prosecution to use its search and 
seizure powers to obtain the evidence from the social media provider.346 
To ensure the robustness of Brady rights to exculpatory evidence in 
the era of digital evidence, courts must also actively manage disputes about 
who should bear the costs of reformatting, cataloging, or reviewing of 
voluminous digital evidence.  Some commentators have suggested that 
prosecutors should be required to actively seek out Brady evidence within a 
mass of digital files and flag this evidence for the defense.347  Such an 
approach would be unworkable in our adversarial system.  Prosecutors 
would find it cognitively difficult to seek out and recognize all the evidence 
that is favorable to the defense and contrary to their theory of the case.348  
 
Process Clause already demands, I focus on the Due Process Clause here. Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987). 
 343 McEnany & Elm, supra note 145, at 60. For examples of such judicial involvement, 
see United States v. Bundy, 2017 WL 81391 (Jan. 9, 2017). 
 344 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 345 Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (Touchstone), 15 Cal. App. 5th 729, 746 (Ct. App. 
2017). 
 346 See Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 443, 445 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 
2015), review granted and opinion superseded sub nom. Facebook, Inc. v. S.C. (Hunter), 
362 P.3d 430 (Cal. 2015). 
 347 See Justin P. Murphy & Matthew A.S. Esworthy, The ESI Tsunami A Comprehensive 
Discussion About Electronically Stored Information in Government Investigations and 
Criminal Cases, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2012, at 31, 41; see also Oran, supra note 93, at 129–30 
(“Under a rebuttable presumption that the defense is not equally or better able to find Brady 
material within the file, the prosecution must also conduct its own search and identify any 
such evidence it finds.”). 
 348 Caroline Buisman, The Prosecutor’s Obligation to Investigate Incriminating and 
Exonerating Circumstances Equally: Illusion or Reality, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 205, 224 
(2014). Even if a prosecutor were inclined to seek out Brady evidence for the defense, he or 
she may not have an adequate basis for the inquiry, since she does not question the 
defendant and cannot always predict what the defense’s strategy or theory of the case is 
likely to be. 
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The approach would also “place prosecutors in the untenable position of 
having to prepare both sides of the case at once.”349 
While courts should not impose such an impracticable burden on the 
prosecution, they can intervene in other ways to ensure that prodigious 
document productions do not undermine the defendant’s right to 
exculpatory evidence.  First, courts could consider the capacity of each 
party to review the evidence and shift cataloging and reviewing burdens to 
the prosecution if necessary to ensure the fairness of the proceeding.  
Specifically, if the defendant presents a special need for assistance (for 
example, if the defendant is detained and acting pro se or is represented by 
an under resourced appointed counsel), while the prosecution has the 
requisite staff and resources, the court may require the prosecution to take 
certain steps to catalog the evidence so as to help the defense find 
potentially exculpatory evidence.  Such steps could include providing a 
detailed table of contents, indexing the disclosed evidence, and providing a 
presumptive identification of Brady documents among those files the 
prosecution has already reviewed.350  Failure by the prosecution to identify 
Brady material in this situation would not in itself constitute a due process 
violation as long as the prosecution has disclosed the Brady material to the 
defense.  Nonetheless, the court could impose sanctions on the prosecution 
if it concludes that the latter has failed to comply with a court order to 
identify Brady material in documents reviewed by the prosecution. 
In cases where the defense shows substantial need, the court may also 
order the prosecutor to share a database or software program that the 
prosecutor has used to search through ESI.  While such a database or 
program may in some cases be protected as work product,351 in civil cases, 
the privilege can be overcome on a showing of substantial need.352  In 
criminal cases, the work product privilege is stricter and does not contain a 
“substantial need” exception, but courts can order disclosure where the 
items to be disclosed may contain Brady material.353  Courts may also be 
 
 349 United States v. Ohle, 2011 WL 651849, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011). 
 350 Cf. Oran, supra note 93, at 129–30 (proposing that courts take into account the 
defendant’s resources in apportioning the duty to identify Brady material). 
 351 It is not entirely clear whether a database prepared by information technology staff or 
contractors would be protected by the work product doctrine—the question is whether it 
contains the mental impressions of the prosecutor concerning the litigation. See, e.g., Gov’t 
of Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 352 Under the federal rules, the party must show “substantial need” for the materials and 
that it “cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(a)(ii). 
 353 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 475 (1996) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“Because Brady is based on the Constitution, it overrides court-made rules of 
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able to order discovery of work product under their inherent authority to 
manage the pretrial and trial proceedings, even where the evidence is not 
necessarily exculpatory, if it is material to the defense and the interests of 
justice require such discovery.354  Current law on this point is uncertain, 
however, so an express rule could help judges manage digital discovery 
more effectively. 
Finally, to ensure fairness in digital discovery, court decisions and 
rules should regulate discovery waivers that arise from lopsided bargains in 
criminal cases.  Such waivers are likely to be increasingly attractive to 
prosecutors as the prosecution’s discovery burdens increase in ESI-heavy 
cases.  But by limiting the information that the defendant receives 
(including potentially exculpatory evidence), discovery waivers can 
undermine the fairness, accuracy, and transparency of a criminal judgment.  
As a recent D.C. Circuit decision highlighted, negotiated discovery waivers 
are often problematic because they arise from a plea bargaining dynamic 
where the prosecution holds most of the bargaining chips, and defense 
attorneys are not always faithful agents of their clients.355  A rule or judicial 
order could therefore require attorneys to justify any “substantial discovery 
waivers” before such waivers are accepted as part of a plea agreement.356  
 
procedure.”); United States v. Heine, 2016 WL 5934421, at *5 (D. Or. Oct. 11, 2016); Ex 
Parte Miles, 359 S.W.3d 647, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
 354 State v. Laux, 117 A.3d 725 (N.H. 2015) (holding that court has inherent authority to 
order discovery of certain work product information in the interests of justice); Miles, 359 
S.W.3d at 670 (noting that trial court must permit discovery if “the evidence sought is 
material to the [d]efense of the accused”). 
 355 Price v. U.S. Dep’t of Just. Att’y Office, 865 F.3d 676, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The 
court explained that the uneven bargaining power leads to waivers that are inconsistent with 
public policy interests: 
[T]his uneven power dynamic lurks in the background in cases like these and calls for 
a careful consideration of Price’s claim. Here Price has shown, through real-world 
examples, that enforcing a FOIA waiver would make it harder for litigants in his 
position to discover potentially exculpatory information or material supporting an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. This is especially true given that, “with rare 
exceptions, only the waivor” in such cases “has the requisite knowledge and interest 
to lodge a FOIA request in the first place.” Amicus Br. 27. On the other side of the 
scale, the government has offered us nothing more than the unsupported blanket 
assertion that FOIA waivers assist in effective and efficient prosecution, without any 
support or explanation how. Under these particular circumstances, and based on the 
briefing in this case, we have little trouble in concluding that the public interest in 
enforcing Price’s waiver is outweighed by the harm to public policy that enforcement 
would cause. 
 356 Brown, supra note 53, at 167. At the insistence of prosecutors, waivers of discovery 
and many other rights have become increasingly common in federal prosecutions. See 
generally Klein et al., supra note 191. On the other hand, some federal judges have used 
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Some courts may even choose to entirely ban certain discovery waivers—
such as waivers of future DNA testing or of future Brady disclosures.357 
In short, an active court can help the parties streamline digital 
discovery and ensure that the process proceeds fairly.  To encourage courts 
to take up this role, state and federal rules of criminal procedure should 
expressly provide for judicial management of digital discovery.  While 
judges can arguably already manage the process actively under their 
inherent authority, many remain passive in the absence of an express 
rule.358  Particularly when dockets are overcrowded, judges might be hard 
pressed to provide active management.359  For all those reasons, an express 
rule requiring judicial involvement is important. 
3. Employing Judicial Adjuncts 
Regardless of how active judicial management of discovery is 
introduced, it is likely to place significant burdens on judges.  For that 
reason, the rules should also authorize “judicial adjuncts”—neutral third 
parties, such as magistrates, special masters, or coordinating discovery 
attorneys (CDAs)— to help the parties manage digital discovery in criminal 
cases.  This approach is already being used in most civil cases with large 
amounts of ESI, and it appears to work well.360 
In criminal cases, a number of courts have appointed defense attorneys 
to serve as CDAs in select multi-defendant cases with gargantuan ESI, 
 
their authority to issue standing orders or enact local court rules to require broader or earlier 
disclosure. See McConkie, supra note 51, at 63. 
 357 Price, 865 F.3d at 679 (invalidating a negotiated waiver of right to request public 
records under FOIA because waiver failed to serve a legitimate criminal justice interest). 
 358 CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 232 (noting that there are judges “who believe it 
is inappropriate to become involved in document and ESI discovery”); Draft Minutes, 
Criminal Rules Meeting, Sept. 19, 2016, at 7, in Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, 
Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 28, 2017, at 25 (noting that problems with managing 
massive e-discovery are “not going to arise in the courtroom of an experienced judge, highly 
engaged, who will craft case management orders to accommodate these situations. The 
concern is that if the judge is inexperienced or not as engaged as he should be, Rule 16 
procedures become the default and as a result counsel will have great difficulty preparing for 
trial.”). 
 359 See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Defense Counsel, Trial Judges, and Evidence Production 
Protocols, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133, 144–45 (2012) (noting the pressure on judges to move 
cases along). But cf. Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea 
Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. 
REV. 325, 327 (2016) (finding that judges may become more managerial both to expedite 
cases and to advance other goals, such as ensuring a just disposition); Jenia I. Turner, 
Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 
253–54 (2006) (same). 
 360 Grimm, supra note 249, at 154–56. 
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where coordination among several defendants in reviewing discovery is 
needed.  The CDA is an attorney who has special expertise in handling 
electronic discovery and who does not represent a particular defendant, but 
instead coordinates discovery for all defendants.361  The CDA helps the 
parties find the relevant tools to store, organize, and review the evidence 
received and resolve disputes about the mechanics of digital discovery.362 
Appointing one defense attorney to manage discovery for multiple 
defendants may raise ethical questions in some cases, as “it is unclear 
whether the CDA is ever expected to act as an attorney—and, if so, on 
whose behalf.”363  If the CDA “represent[s] the defendants’ legal interests 
in any manner, then he or she will have responsibilities to all defendants at 
the same time,” yet the different defendants’ interests may come into 
conflict.364  CDAs’ functions therefore have to be defined narrowly and 
carefully in multi-defendant cases.  Courts must also conduct a special 
hearing to advise defendants of their right to separate and conflict-free 
representation and ask defendants whether they agree to joint representation 
by the CDA.365 
In addition to the potential ethical questions surrounding CDA 
appointment in multi-defendant cases, CDAs may be expensive.   The 
federal Defender Services Office has argued, however, that if a 
knowledgeable CDA is appointed, “the overall case processing times and 
 
 361 The federal Defender Services Office (DSO) has contracted with five national CDAs, 
who are experts on e-discovery. When federal defense attorneys or judges reach out to the 
DSO, the Office can help assess the need for a CDA and coordinate the appointment of a 
CDA as necessary. Defender Services Office, Coordinating Discovery Attorneys, at 
https://fd.org/litigation-support/coordinating-discovery-attorneys [https://perma.cc/RK3W-
TAVX]. 
 362 See, e.g., United States v. Vujanic, 2014 WL 3868448 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2014); 
United States v. Flores, 2014 WL 1308608, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014) (CDA appointed 
for RICO gang case involving hundreds of thousands of documents, 15,800 audio 
recordings, and 100 videos, many of which were heavily redacted to protect the safety of 
witnesses); United States v. Shafer, 2011 WL 977891, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2011). The 
functions and duties of a CDA remain somewhat ill-defined. As one court observed: 
A CDA is an attorney, yet it is unclear whether the CDA is ever expected to act as an 
attorney—and, if so, on whose behalf. A CDA is not intended . . . to participate in 
strategic coordination among counsel for co-defendants. Rather, he or she would be 
performing tasks that each individual defense counsel would otherwise perform, but 
would be doing so on behalf of all defendants. 
United States v. Hernandez, 2014 WL 4510266, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2014). 
 363 Hernandez, 2014 WL 4510266, at *4. 
 364 Id. 
 365 Id. 
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costs are likely to be reduced.”366  As a result, the popularity of CDAs is 
growing, and courts and even some prosecutors in complex federal cases 
involving ESI are increasingly requesting or even requiring that defense 
attorneys obtain the help of a CDA.367 
The court could alternatively appoint a special master to help 
coordinate digital discovery and mediate disputes that may arise.  Special 
masters differ from CDAs in that they work on behalf of the court rather 
than the defense and therefore are not likely to raise ethical issues in multi-
defendant cases.  On the other hand, they are also likely to be expensive368 
and not as successful in securing the trust of defense attorneys, which 
would diminish their effectiveness.  Accordingly, special masters are less 
likely to be used on a regular basis in criminal matters. 
Judges might, however, also be able to rely on federal magistrates to 
manage digital discovery disputes in criminal cases, as they already do in 
civil cases.369  Although the involvement of magistrate judges is not cost-
free, it may ultimately be more efficient if it reduces discovery disputes 
between prosecutors and defense attorneys and expedites case resolution in 
voluminous ESI cases.  The value of involving magistrates in criminal case 
discovery has already been recognized by local rules that have expanded 
magisterial participation in this area.370  And at least at the federal level, 
magistrate judges are likely better able to absorb discovery duties than are 
district court judges.  Over the last three decades, the number of magistrate 
judges has increased at a much higher rate than the number of district 
 
 366 Defender Services Office, Coordinating Discovery Attorneys, at https://fd.org/ 
litigation-support/coordinating-discovery-attorneys [https://perma.cc/PEV6-FTYG]. 
 367 CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 233. 
 368 Thomas E. Willging et al., Special Masters’ Incidence and Activity, Report to the 
Judicial Conference’s Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and Its Subcommittee on Special 
Masters 7 (FED. JUD. CTR. 2000), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/specmast.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TQA7-A4AG] (finding that the typical rate for special master fees in civil 
cases was $200 per hour and that the median total compensation in twelve civil case 
appointments studied was about $63,000). But cf. Josh Gerstein, ‘Special Master’ in Cohen 
Raid Bills $47K for First Week’s Work, POLITICO (May 29, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/29/michael-cohen-bills-legal-611507 
[https://perma.cc/7BUD-3UKE] (reporting on special master in high-profile criminal case 
who charged roughly $700/hour for privilege review of voluminous ESI). 
 369 Grimm, supra note 249, at 154–56 (discussing the use of magistrates in managing 
discovery in civil cases); McConkie, supra note 51, at 100–01 (discussing the authority and 
expanding use of magistrates in managing pretrial proceedings, including discovery, in 
criminal cases); Turner, supra note 359, at 265 (discussing the authority of magistrate judges 
to handle pretrial matters, including plea negotiations, in criminal cases). 
 370 McConkie, supra note 51, at 100–01. 
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judges.371  A few courts have already relied on the services of magistrates to 
handle voluminous digital discovery in criminal cases, and express 
encouragement of this practice can help enhance the fairness and efficiency 
of the process.372 
4. Drafting Detailed Rules 
In addition to managerial judging, more detailed rules are necessary to 
address the multiple challenges of e-discovery in criminal cases.  Such rules 
can provide greater predictability, facilitate negotiations between the 
parties, and reduce disputes, leaving less to the discretion and managerial 
skills of judges.  Draft Rule 16.1 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
which mandates consultation between the parties, is a critical first step in 
this direction.373  Criminal rules could follow the civil model even further 
and require the parties to develop a discovery plan or explain why they 
were not able to develop such a plan.  The plan would consider digital 
discovery issues such as those enumerated in the ESI Protocol and any 
other points of contention regarding discovery.  It would force the parties to 
acknowledge their discovery obligations early in the process and prod them 
toward cooperation.  It would also provide the court with a better tool to 
manage the discovery process should cooperation fail later in the 
proceedings.374 
Local rules in certain federal districts have already experimented with 
such a “discovery checklist” approach to discovery.375  This is an important 
source of information for what provisions might be effective.  But local 
rules cannot provide a long-term, comprehensive solution.  Under the Rules 
Enabling Act, they cannot substantially exceed existing provisions in the 
 
 371 Id. at 101 (citing Douglas A. Lee & Thomas E. Davies, Nothing Less Than 
Indispensable: The Expansion of Federal Magistrate Judge Authority and Utilization in the 
Past Quarter Century, 16 NEV. L. J. 845, 856–57 (2016)). 
 372 See, e.g., United States v. Crinel, 2016 WL 5779778 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2016); United 
States v. Slade, 2011 WL 5291757 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2011); United States v. Marin, 662 F. 
Supp. 2d 155, 160 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 373 Draft Rule 16.1, supra note 22. 
 374 See McConkie, supra note 51, at 92–93 (noting that local rule requirements for 
pretrial conferences and discovery plans promote cooperation between the parties, but also 
“make it easier for the court to impose sanctions for failure to meet any agreed-upon 
deadlines”). 
 375 Id. at 90–92, 95–97 (citing W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(A); D. NEV. LOCAL R. 
CRIM. P. R. 16-1; D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.5); see also General Order Regarding Best 
Practices for Electronic Discovery of Documentary Materials in Criminal Cases, G.O. 09-05 
(W.D. Okla. 2009); Best Practices for Electronic Discovery in Criminal Cases (W.D. Wash. 
2013). 
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Federal Rules.376  Furthermore, dealing with discovery issues through local 
rules or individual judicial discretion raises the problem of disparate 
treatment of federal defendants based on the court in which their cases are 
brought.  For those reasons, uniform state and federal rules on digital 
discovery are needed. 
Rules of procedure can promote a fairer discovery process by 
requiring that the parties produce ESI in a “reasonably usable” form and a 
searchable format—a requirement present in the civil rules and imposed by 
some courts in criminal cases.  In fact, one jurisdiction—New Jersey, 
recently adopted criminal rules on e-discovery which require that files must 
generally be provided in publicly available formats or with software that 
would allow the recipient to review the files.377  Going beyond the New 
Jersey model, the rules can specify that if proprietary software is needed to 
access the files, and the receiving party does not have the software, the 
court may require the producing party to convert the file to a different 
format.378  Additionally, the rules may authorize the court to order the party 
producing the ESI to provide other technical assistance to enable the 
receiving party to view the documents.379  Where the receiving party shows 
that metadata are important to the case, the rules could further authorize the 
court to order that files be produced in their native format, as well as in a 
searchable format.380  In practice, the prosecution is likely to be producing 
most of the evidence so it will ordinarily have to bear the costs of 
reformatting.  But in most cases, it will also have significantly greater 
resources than the defense.  In those few situations where the asymmetry of 
resources is reversed,381 the rules could permit the prosecution to move the 
court to shift some of the reformatting costs to the defense.382 
The rules could also offer more concrete guidance on the organization 
of the ESI produced in discovery.  To begin, they could require the 
producing party (again, typically the prosecution) to provide an index or 
detailed table of contents for disclosed ESI, which could help the receiving 
party sift through voluminous data.383  New Jersey, the only state to 
 
 376 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(a)(1); McConkie, supra note 51, at 115. 
 377 See N.J. CT. R. 3:13–3. 
 378 For civil cases along these lines, see supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
 379 For civil cases along these lines, see supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
 380  See N.J. CT. R. 3:13–3; see also note 96 and accompanying text. 
 381 For a recent example, see Sam Pearson, Deep-Pocketed Arkema Tough Target for 
Texas Prosecutors, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 7, 2018. 
 382 For an example of a rule authorizing the shifting of costs from the prosecution to the 
defense under certain circumstances, see N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3. 
 383 Id. 
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regulate digital discovery in criminal cases so far, has a similar rule on its 
books.384  Prosecutors have also provided indexes or tables of contents on 
their own initiative in a number of cases, suggesting that the requirement is 
not impractical.385 
The rules could also authorize the court to impose further 
organizational requirements after evaluating the volume and searchability 
of the evidence produced, the resources of the defense, and the ability of the 
defendant to assist his or her lawyers with review of the evidence.  
Specifically, the court could require the prosecution to identify the most 
relevant documents in the production, as well as documents that the 
prosecution has not reviewed.  It could further require the prosecution to 
provide indexes for audio and video files and make them as searchable as 
possible.  Where the receiving party (typically the defense) shows good 
cause, the rules may also permit it to use limited interrogatories regarding 
the sources and organization of voluminous ESI produced.386 
In summary, more detailed provisions on the form and organization of 
digital discovery can help encourage and guide informal discussions 
between the parties.  Such rules can also help judges manage digital 
discovery to achieve fairness and efficiency when discussions between the 
parties fail to produce an agreement. 
5. Investing in Training and Technology 
Beyond implementing the legal reforms discussed in the previous 
sections, state and federal authorities and professional associations can 
facilitate digital discovery by investing in training and technology for the 
lawyers and judges who handle ESI-intensive criminal cases.  Such training 
has occurred with federal judges and attorneys who handle e-discovery in 
civil cases, and it is beginning to happen in criminal cases.387  Professional 
 
 384 Id. 
 385 See supra Part V.A. As another comparison point, prosecutors in England and Wales 
must also provide a “disclosure schedule” that is in many ways akin to an index. The 
schedule needs to identify each item containing stored data, provide a “description of what 
steps have been taken, by whom, to examine and analyse [sic] the information held on the 
storage media, on a chronological basis (e.g., a log detailing times and duration of access,” 
and “a listing of the information held on the media, either compiled by the 
investigator . . . based on keyword searches or ‘sampling,’ or present on the media itself 
(e.g., a directory structure).” IAN WALDEN, COMPUTER CRIMES AND DIGITAL INVESTIGATIONS 
ch. 6 (2nd ed. 2016). 
 386 For civil cases along these lines, see supra note 308 and accompanying text. 
 387 See, e.g., Broderick et al., supra note 45; CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 232–
34; see also Eric H. Holder, Jr., In the Digital Age, Ensuring That the Department Does 
Justice, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii (2012). 
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responsibility rules in over thirty states recognize the duty of attorneys to 
acquire an adequate understanding of technology—and digital discovery in 
particular—in order to assist their clients competently.388  State bar 
associations and other professional associations serving the criminal justice 
community have begun providing continuing legal education to ensure that 
attorneys are meeting their duties; attorneys should be encouraged to take 
advantage of these learning opportunities. 
Technological advances such as predictive coding are also 
increasingly used in civil cases to reduce the cost of discovery, and they can 
be used successfully in criminal cases as well.389  The main obstacle at this 
point is the lack of expertise among defense attorneys with predictive 
coding and the lack of funding to hire the relevant experts and invest in the 
technology. But jurisdictions may be able to afford purchasing such 
technology for use in a centralized fashion, through a statewide or federal 
defender service. 
To address the massive challenges that the growth of ESI presents for 
criminal cases more broadly, legislators ought to invest in a more robust 
digital discovery infrastructure for the criminal justice system, similar to the 
one already provided for federal prosecutors.390  This infrastructure would 
serve not only prosecutors’ offices, but also the courts, public defenders, 
court-appointed defense attorneys, and perhaps even retained counsel (the 
latter at a cost).  It would allow the parties to store and manage ESI and to 
resolve digital discovery disputes more efficiently and effectively. It would 
also permit more active judicial management of digital discovery. 
In brief, better training, technology, and infrastructure would help the 
parties understand and solve more easily the challenges of digital discovery.  
Investment in this area would produce measurable returns in terms of 
quicker resolution of discovery disputes and quicker disposition of cases.  It 
would also help ensure that the proliferation of ESI does not undermine the 
aims of discovery rules—to promote fairness, accuracy, and transparency in 
criminal adjudication. 
 
 388 See, e.g., State Bar of California, Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & 
Conduct, Formal Op. 2015-193 (2015); MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.1 cmt. 8. As of 
September 24, 2018, thirty-one states had adopted the comment to Rule 1.1 requiring 
lawyers to maintain technological competence. Robert Ambrogi, Tech Competence, 
LawSites Blog, https://www.lawsitesblog.com/tech-competence/ [https://perma.cc/87CM-
5AST] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
 389 See supra notes 267–272 and accompanying text. 
 390 See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Thanks to technological advances, the volume of evidence available in 
criminal cases is growing.  An increasing number of crimes are committed 
or facilitated in cyberspace.391  Even for ordinary crimes, the pervasive 
nature of digital communication—via smartphones and other digital 
devices—makes electronically stored information a standard feature of 
criminal cases.392  Law enforcement itself is also relying ever more on 
digital surveillance technologies and investigation by software.393  As a 
result, the disclosure and review of electronic evidence is no longer the 
exclusive concern of lawyers handling complex civil cases and white-collar 
crime prosecutions.  Instead, judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors 
across the criminal justice system face the unique challenges of digital 
discovery. 
The growing demands of digital discovery are likely to push the 
parties to cooperate and negotiate about digital discovery, just as they 
already negotiate about other aspects of the case.  Greater cooperation could 
help reduce the cost and volume of discovery, and in some cases, alleviate 
unfairness in the process, and courts have rightly begun to encourage it.  
But negotiations in criminal cases are not always fairly balanced, and they 
do not always succeed.  Accordingly, courts and legislators need to 
consider regulation of digital discovery that provides a backstop when 
cooperation falters. 
The civil procedure model offers some useful insights for such 
regulations.  These include rules requiring the court to intervene and 
manage e-discovery when negotiations fall apart, techniques designed to 
reduce the cost of e-discovery, and principles designed to address 
asymmetries of resources and information. 
The civil litigation model has its limitations, however, and 
policymakers must chart new ground to address some of the unique 
demands of criminal cases.  To redress the vast resource, information, and 
bargaining disparities in criminal cases, and to protect defendants’ rights to 
due process and effective counsel, courts may need to intervene more 
actively in digital discovery in criminal cases.  Where the interests of 
justice require it, courts could help defendants obtain evidence from third 
parties, receive evidence in a format that permits adequate review for 
exculpatory material, and access digital discovery in detention.  These and 
 
 391 See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
 392 See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
 393 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
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other measures can help prevent the cost and complexity of digital 
discovery from undermining the fairness of the criminal proceedings. 
 
